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The Enterprise of Integration: 
The Case of Urban Refugees in Rwanda 
Abstract: Interviews were undertaken over a series of months with 20 
Congolese refugees living in Kigali. The study explores their levels of 
integration in all of the legal, economic, and social/cultural dimensions. 
Taking into account the differing degrees of support received, this study 
also makes comparisons between those refugees officially recognized as 
urban, and those who were not. Finally, factors for successful refugee 
integration are assessed. 
10 January 2011 
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What could this man have been yesterday? A sower in the spring, a 
harvester in the fall...? And today? A refugee, with a bowl in his hand, 
queuing for soup. What a waste of human energy, I think, an abasement 
of dignity...a billion people capable of work with nothing or almost nothing 
to do for the duration of their lives...If they could be given worthwhile 
occupations, humanity could make dizzying progress. The world's wealth 
would be doubled. Pyramids of merchandise would rise in even the 
poorest countries. Granaries would overflow. Water would flood the largest 
deserts. 
- Richard Kapuscinski (1991) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The movement of peoples from one part of the world to another has taken 
place at all times in human history, on varying scales, and under a vast 
array of circumstances. The reasons behind such movements may differ -
from the climatic to political to religious - but the pressures of human 
migration continue to transform the world in all of the political, economic, 
social, and cultural realms. 
In recent years, the number of people forced to seek out life in a new 
country has greatly increased, largely due to a rise in natural disasters and 
conflicts, as well as improved functions of global mobility. Whether the 
process occurs slowly through cultural infiltration or more rapidly, as in the 
case of refugees fleeing a conflict, patterns of human migration have 
significant consequences for all of the migrants themselves, the host 
country, and the international community. 
The phenomenon itself may not be a new one, but the global response to 
cases of human migration continues to change dramatically. In the 
developed and developing worlds alike, countries are increasingly 
establishing stricter immigration policies in response to the parallel rise in 
the number of people seeking asylum within their borders. As the 
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processes of globalization continue to threaten national sovereignty, states 
are continually seeking out new ways to protect their own interests and 
those of their citizens. It was at this crossroads that refugee law, and with 
it the very definition of a refugee, arose. States have had to come face to 
face with the harsh realities of large population movements - and the hefty 
responsibilities of hosting them. 
Since the official legal refugee protection regime began in 1951, the 
international community has favored the use of refugee camps as its 
central organizing concept. The key flaw that lies therein is the assumption 
of the temporal nature of refugee crises. Refugee camps are meant to be 
short-term responses to a short-term emergency. The reality, however, 
paints a different picture. In fact, almost 70 percent of the world's refugees 
have been in camps for ten years or more (USCRI, 2005). That long-term 
heavy reliance on camps can have a negative impact on all of the 
refugees, locals, and host countries involved. 
The thesis at issue aims to explore alternatives to refugee camps in cases 
of protracted refugee crises. Specifically, it aims to develop and test a 
methodology for analyzing the viability of integration in the case of a 
select group of urban refugees in Rwanda. The main structure of the 
thesis is, therefore, twofold. First, it will develop a concept for analyzing 
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the viability of integration as one alternative solution to protracted refugee 
crises by revisiting the literature on both the theory and current-day 
responses to refugee crises; demonstrating the need for alternative 
responses to protracted refugee crises; and developing a research 
methodology. 
Second, the thesis will apply the methodology and test it by means of a 
case study of urban refugees in Rwanda. It will analyze their levels of self-
sufficiency and integration in their local communities, and the associating 
causal factors. It will then draw together conclusions from the findings, and 
identify a number of potential opportunities that exist for the major 
stakeholders in order to maximize integration as one possible alternative 
solution to protracted refugee crises. Table 1 below provides an overview 
of the thesis structure. 
Overall Goal 
To develop and test a methodology for analyzing the viability of integration in the case 
of a select group of urban refugees in Rwanda. 
First Objective 
• To develop the concept for analyzing the viability of integration as one alternative 
solution to protracted refugee crises. 
• To revisit the literature on both the theory and the current-day responses to 
refugee crises; 
• To demonstrate the need for alternative responses to protracted refugee crises; 
• To develop the research methodology to test the viability of integration as one 
alternative response to protracted refugee crises. 
Second Objective 
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• To apply the concept to urban refugees in Rwanda and identify potential 
opportunities that exist for the major stakeholders in order to maximize integration 
as one possible alternative solution to protracted refugee crises. 
• To analyze the levels of self-sufficiency and integration of select urban refugees in 
Rwanda; 
To identify the causal factors and identify potential opportunities. 
Situated in the heart of Africa's Great Lakes region, Rwanda presents an 
ideal site for carrying out this case study. Due to its volatile history, it is 
often considered to be an exclusively refugee-producing country. As such, 
little research has been conducted to date into Rwanda's role as a 
refugee-hosting country. And yet some 59,000 refugees call Rwanda their 
home (USCRI, 2009). More importantly, while media attention and the 
services of government and various international and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) focus on those refugees in the burgeoning camps 
along Rwanda's borders, the country's urban refugees often slip under 
their radar. Indeed, no research to date has been conducted into the 
situation of Rwanda's 2,547 officially recognized urban refugees who, 
although they may not make up a significant proportion of the population, 
are nonetheless important actors for the Government of Rwanda to 
consider as it strives to achieve its goal of becoming a middle-income 
country by the year 2020, and in upholding its commitments under 
international humanitarian law. Far beyond its theoretical value as a 
contribution to the body of knowledge, therefore, this thesis hopes to prove 
directly beneficial to Rwanda and its people. 
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2. DEFINITIONS 
This chapter presents working definitions of the concepts of refugees, 
urban refugees, and protracted refugee crises that are used throughout 
this study. 
2.1 What is a refugee? 
Article 1 of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees defines a refugee as any person who: 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country or to return there 
because there is a fear of persecution. 
Refugees are often confused with other migrants. Economic migrants are 
those who make a conscious choice to leave their country to seek a better 
life, and have no specific political reasons not to return. Illegal immigrants 
are those who enter a country without meeting legal requirements for 
entry, or residence, but who do not have a well-founded fear of 
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persecution in their own country. Refugees should also not be confused 
with other persons of concern. An asylum seeker is a person who has left 
their country of origin, has applied for recognition as a refugee in another 
country, and is awaiting a decision on their application. An internally 
displaced person (IDP) may have been forced to flee their home for the 
same reasons as a refugee, but has not crossed an internationally 
recognized border. 
While all twenty refugees who participated in this study were officially 
recognized as such, it is important to note that there are often times there 
are many who fall under the legal definition but are not actually recognized 
by their respective governments (Hovil, 2007). In this particular study, 
however, there is an important distinction to be made between refugees 
who were granted the government's permission to take up residence in 
Kigali, and those who chose to do so without the legal right. 
2.2 What is an urban refugee? 
The question of what constitutes an 'urban refugee' is a contentious one 
as it is often used to classify all forced migrants in urban areas as the 
same, making no distinction between those who have been legally 
recognized as such and those who have not. The body of literature on 
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international law fails to adequately or clearly define urban refugees as a 
distinct category within the refugee population. Instead, their existence 
would simply seem to be implied by the over 40 universal and regional 
instruments that are concerned with refugees (Campbell, 2006). As varied 
as the definition of an urban refugee is, so too are the number of reasons 
why refugees choose to settle in urban areas instead of seeking the 
protection and assistance of government-sponsored refugee camps. 
For instance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) (Obi and Crisp, 2001) suggests that the massive influx of 
refugees in Kenya in the 1990s and the lack of arable land meant that 
refugees were settled into camps located in arid and semi arid areas. It 
was thus a desire to escape these barren conditions that led many 
refugees to seek out new lives in urban areas. In addition to environmental 
factors, refugees choose the urban life for a number of other reasons. 
Indeed, studies have repeatedly shown that despite the availability of food 
aid and services in places of encampment, people prefer freedom, and the 
autonomy to decide and rebuild their own lives. 
According to Bailey (2004, p.7), an urban refugee is "an individual living in 
an urban area outside of his/her country of origin who meets the criteria 
put forth in the Refugee Convention even if the person has not been 
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recognized by a host government." Sommers (2001) outlines four distinct 
categories of urban refugees: (i) the few who are officially defined as 
refugees and have permission to reside in cities; (ii) those officially defined 
as refugees but lacking legal rights to urban residence; (iii) those who 
have come to an urban area to seek asylum as a refugee at a UNHCR 
office; and (iv) those who claim to be refugees but live without any 
institutional recognition or assistance. 
2.3 What is a protracted refugee crisis? 
A protracted refugee situation is defined as "one in which refugees find 
themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may 
not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and 
psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile" (ExCOM, 2004, 
p.1). Such a situation can arise from the direct cause of the conflict being 
prolonged, as was the case with Angola's thirty-year civil war, with 
refugees being unable to return, or from indirect causes, such as when 
various stakeholders with vested interests are to blame. For instance, 
political actors with control of certain parts of the country, and others 
wanting to cash in on the underground economies created by the conflict 
would have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo (Goetz, 2003). 
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3. UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS 
This chapter sets the context for this study by providing a brief 
examination of the global nature of the refugee crisis and the international 
legal response to it. 
3.1 Dimensions 
By the end of 2008, the number of people of concern to the UNHCR was 
34.4 million, up from 21.02 million in 2006. This figure includes 10.5 million 
refugees, 14.4 million IDPs, 6.6 million stateless people, and 827,000 
asylum seekers. An additional 1.4 million people were considered to be in 
refugee-like situations, and 51,000 in IDP-like situations. Meanwhile, 
604,000 refugees repatriated voluntarily throughout the year (UNHCR, 
.2009). 
No continent and few countries are left unaffected by the modern day 
refugee crisis. One third of all refugees live in Asia and the Pacific, three 
quarters of who are Afghans. The Middle East and North Africa host one 
fifth of all refugees, the majority of whom come from Iraq. Meanwhile, sub-
Saharan Africa and Europe host 20 and 15 percent of the world's refugees 
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respectively. The Americas trail with just eight percent of the world's 
refugees (UNHCR, 2009). 
For the past three decades, Afghanistan has been the leading refugee 
producing country, with 2.8 million Afghan refugees - or one out of four 
refugees in the world - in 69 different asylum countries by the end of 
2008. Iraqi refugees followed, with 1.9 million. Together, Afghan and Iraqi 
refugees account for 45 percent of refugees under UNHCR's mandate. 
These groups are followed by Somali and Sudanese refugees, with 
561,000 and 419,000 respectively. Other significant refugee producing 
countries include Colombia, with 374,000, and the DRC, with 368,000 
(UNHCR, 2009). 
The world over, "warehoused" populations of refugees can be found. In 
2004, it was estimated that almost 60 percent of the world's refugees 
could be considered warehoused, meaning they are virtually dependent on 
humanitarian assistance and are not free to work, practice professions, 
run businesses, or own property (Smith, 2004). From the Congolese 
refugees living in Tanzania's refugee camps for more than five years, to 
the Palestinians who have made the West Bank their home for the past 60 
years, refugees - and the camps that house them - can be found across 
the globe. 
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Last year, the global refugee population fell for the first time in two years, 
largely as a result of voluntary repatriation, and improved demographic 
data coverage (UNHCR, 2009). Still, this is offset by the rising trend of 
people being encouraged to stay in their country even in exile, as 
demonstrated by the increase in number of IDPs. 
3.2 The international legal context 
Although this thesis is not focused directly on examining the body of laws 
that protects refugees, it is nevertheless important to address the major 
international legal instruments put in place by the UN that currently govern 
the rights and treatment of refugees, and which impose obligations on 
states to protect those rights. According to Lubbers (2002), the notion that 
the international community has a responsibility for the protection and care 
of refugees is one that stems from the creation of the League of Nations in 
1920. Following the turmoil and mass movements of people that resulted 
from World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, an "international conscience" began to develop; no 
longer was the burden of refugee hosting to fall solely on the shoulders of 
individual governments or private charitable organizations. 
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The League defined refugees in terms of their ethnic background: certain 
groups, such as Armenians and German Jews, were deemed to be in 
danger if they were to return to their home countries. Over the years, the 
League introduced a number of measures and implemented new 
agreements designed to protect refugees as new situations emerged. For 
instance, the "Nansen passport" - named after the first High 
Commissioner for Refugees - was established, providing, for the first time, 
refugee travel documents that were honored by governments in 52 
countries. More than 450,000 Nansen passports were issued that allowed 
its holders to immigrate, with the effort being such a success that the 
Nansen International Office for Refugees was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1938. From identity papers and travel documents, legal measures 
became increasingly comprehensive over time. Eventually, even such 
matters as access to employment and protection from expulsion were 
addressed. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out everyone's basic 
human rights, including "the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution" (Art. 14). However, this general right to seek and 
enjoy asylum does not ensure the right to be granted asylum. Thus, 
additional and broader international legal instruments had to be drawn up 
to guarantee the protection of refugees and outline their inherent rights. In 
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1951, the international community took a significant step in this direction 
by creating the UNHCR, whose mandate included providing international 
protection and seeking permanent solutions for the problems of refugees. 
In the aftermath of World War II, UNHCR created the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees. It was the international community's 
attempt to broaden its definition and protection of refugees, a necessary 
measure in the face of the large numbers of people who had been 
displaced as a result of the turmoil. A legally binding treaty and a 
milestone in international refugee law, the Convention guarantees 
minimum standards for refugees within their country of asylum and aims to 
ensure that refugees are treated in the same way in all states which are 
party to the Convention. Underlying this Convention is the encouragement 
of states to fully incorporate persons granted refugee status into the social, 
economic, legal and political fabric of their new society through a process 
of naturalization. Whether or not refugees become citizens of their host 
states in terms of legal rights, the Convention requires state parties to 
extend to refugees the same standard of treatment that it does to nationals 
in some cases, and in others, as favorable as possible and not less 
favorable to that accorded aliens generally in the same circumstances. 
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Subsequent events demonstrated that movements of refugees were by no 
means limited to the effects of World War II in Europe. As new refugee 
groups emerged, it became increasingly necessary to adapt the 
Convention in order to make it applicable to new refugee situations 
(UNHCR, 1993). In 1967, a Protocol was introduced making the 
Convention truly universal. By 2000, a total of 139 countries had signed 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol. 
In 1969, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also passed its own 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in 
Africa (African Refugee Convention), which narrowed the international 
treaty to the African context. Until that point, apart from the UN 
Convention, there existed no legal instrument that offered official 
protection to refugees on the continent. To fill that gap, as well as to show 
solidarity with African peoples still under European colonial domination, 
the OAU established this relatively wide-reaching refugee policy. 
Despite incorporating the UN Convention, the OAU Protocol went above 
and beyond it, expanding the very definition of a refugee to persons 
fleeing colonial domination and anti-colonial warfare. Whereas the UN 
Convention placed the emphasis on individual persecution, the OAU 
definition concentrated on groups of people at risk during a conflict 
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(Holborn, 1975). The Protocol specified that the granting of asylum should 
be a neutral decision, and not one seen as a hostile act by the refugee-
producing state. Article Five of the OAU Convention also addresses the 
question of durable solutions for refugees, claiming voluntary repatriation 
as the ultimate solution. Importantly, it makes an explicit provision that it is 
up to refugees themselves to determine the time and manner in which 
they will return home (Bakwesegha, 1995). 
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan once said, "Human rights 
belong not to a chosen few, but to all people. It is this universality that 
endows human rights with the power to cross any border and defy any 
force" (Annan, 1999). Accordingly, simply by crossing an international 
border, someone does not lose his or her rights as outlined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Refugees, as defined by the 1951 
Convention must, for instance, receive the same treatment as nationals of 
the host country with regard to free exercise of religion, access to 
elementary education, access to public assistance, and protection of 
social security. They must receive the same standard of treatment 
provided to nationals of a foreign country with regard to the right to belong 
to trade unions and the right to engage in wage-earning employment. 
Under the Convention, refugees must also receive the most favorable 
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treatment possible with regard to the right to own property, the right to 
practice a profession, the right to self-employment, and access to housing. 
As defined in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, in order to gain refugee 
status individuals must show that they subjectively fear persecution and 
that their fear is rational or reasonable, based on objective facts. Thus 
both elements - the subjective (how they perceive the threat) and the 
objective (the facts) must be considered in determining the existence of 
well-founded fear (Hathaway and Hicks, 2005). 
The large body of international laws and the many organizations 
established to assist and protect refugees do not discount the many 
challenges and tensions inherent in international refugee law and the 
international refugee regime. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of 
the international legal framework regarding refugees, the content of such 
legislation becomes irrelevant if governments choose not to enforce them. 
Onyango (1986, p. 1) describes the OAU charter as "pragmatic" and 
"progressive"; and notes that (at the time) thirty-three member states had 
ratified the agreement. However he also observes that only a few of these 
countries have modified their national legal systems to reflect the 
Convention's principles. Lack of enforcement mechanisms, multiple 
options for interpretation, and lack of state capacity to address the rights of 
refugees can lead to a lack of rights protection (Mecagni, 2005). However, 
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their existence does signify the international community's commitment to 
refugee protection. 
While the international community struggles to find ways to effectively 
implement its agreed upon laws, host countries are concurrently trying to 
etch out suitable national responses given the constrained global 
environment within which they are situated. In fact, given the international 
legal framework within which host countries operate, the line between 
national and international policies - and their respective impacts - is 
frequently blurred. National sovereignty falls by the wayside, for instance, 
when it comes to Refugee Status Determination, which is primarily 
conducted by the UNHCR (although Rwanda is a notable exception to 
this). Indeed, Karadawi (1999) argues that much refugee policy in the 
Global South has been driven by the demands of external donors and 
humanitarian organizations. However, whether national or international in 
nature, the legal framework governing the lives of refugees can be a 
strong determinant in the quality of their lives. As Bailey (2004, p.5) notes, 
"These rights (in particular regarding movement, employment, identity 
documents, detention and deportation) have a bearing on the livelihood 
opportunities for urban refugees." 
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4. RESPONDING TO THE GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for this study by conducting 
a literature review of the arguments concerning relief versus development 
efforts, as well as the concept of urban refugees as burdens or boons in 
the development trajectory. 
4.1 Relief versus development 
Responses to refugee crises generally fall within the landscape of the 
debate concerning relief versus development. The relationship between 
the two concepts is an important one since the development community 
has seen much of its investment eroded in recent years by conflict, while 
relief agencies recognize the need for sustainable peace for the long-term 
success of their work (Smillie, 1998). 
Relief efforts are aimed at delivering services, treating the symptoms of a 
problem, and meeting immediate short-term needs. On the other hand, 
development - at least in theory - aims to facilitate change, tackle the root 
causes of a problem, and prevent it from happening again. It takes on 
long-term objectives in working to transform and build capacity. Here, the 
focus tends to be on the community, utilizing existing leadership styles and 
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structures, versus the primary partner and recipient as the individual in 
relief efforts. 
Meanwhile, development works on a smaller scale and often takes on a 
much more decentralized and participatory structure, while relief efforts 
tend to use donor structures that are hierarchical and centralized, and 
which operate on a much larger and impersonal scale. Development is 
intended to begin with the locals' perceived needs, while relief efforts 
begin with the international and donor community's perceived needs. Of 
course, it is important to note the distinction between theory and practice, 
with much of both development and relief work being guided by the need 
to attract global donors. 
From the 1960s to 1980s, the standard approach to relief and 
development was a linear one. They were seen as two distinct and 
sequential concepts; emergency efforts moved from relief through 
reconstruction to development along a continuum. In the early 1990s, the 
two became no longer viewed as self-contained processes. Today, as 
Smillie (1998) suggests, there is a general agreement that unless relief 
efforts capitalize on inherent development potential, the vulnerability of 
societies in crisis to emergencies is likely to continue and perhaps even 
deepen. 
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However, both relief and development efforts continue to be plagued by 
three major challenges (Smillie, 1998). The first is timing - when to 
engage, when to modify the intervention, and when to withdraw. This is, of 
course, determined by such factors as political will and financial resources. 
This leads to the second challenge of funding, with both relief and 
development funding remaining sporadic, patchy, and largely driven by 
political agendas. Because short-term funding is required for long-term 
needs, both relief and development efforts have felt the effects of declining 
overall aid resources. The third challenge is in understanding and learning 
from past efforts. 
Within the debate surrounding relief versus development lie the various 
responses to a refugee crisis. There are three major durable solutions, 
though not specifically coined as such in the 1951 Convention, that are 
usually prescribed by UNHCR. The first is repatriation, which consists of 
the 4Rs: Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. 
Here, resources are allocated to improve the environment inside the 
countries of origin so as to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees. Some 
604,000 refugees repatriated voluntarily during 2008. Repatriation figures 
have continued to decrease since 2004, with the 2008 figure the second-
lowest in 15 years (UNHCR, 2009). 
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The second solution is integration into the host country, which will be the 
focus of this thesis and thus explored in greater detail below (see Ch. 5). 
The final solution is resettlement to a third country. However, this option is, 
in reality, viable for only a very small number of the world's refugees. Hynd 
(2002) notes that while local integration was historically a preferred option, 
a shift in the 1970s and 1980s towards resettlement resulted in 
resettlement fatigue. Crisp (2003) notes that a second shift also occurred 
in the mid-1980s whereby repatriation became seen as the only viable 
solution. 
What all of these solutions have in common is the struggle to find an 
effective way to close the gap between emergency relief and longer-term 
development when dealing with refugee crises. 
4.2 Burden versus boon 
While the theoretical debate on development versus relief is a central one 
to the question of response to the refugee crises, so too is the question of 
refugees as a burden or a boon to their host communities. According to 
Sommers (2001, p.348), when people become refugees, they have two 
dramatically different practical alternatives: "living in organized settlements 
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or camps, or pursuing what has come to be known as settling 
spontaneously." Kuhlman (1994) notes that both African governments and 
the UN have routinely preferred organized settlements over integration as 
a response because they are easier to control and assist. Thus, host 
country responses are constructed in such a way that discourages any 
processes of refugee integration (Kibreab, 2003). Rutinwa (1999, p. 15) 
suggests that African governments have abandoned their open door policy 
towards refugees because of "the pressure exerted on them by the sheer 
magnitude of the refugee problem, the impact of refugees on host 
communities, security concerns, the economic crisis...and the failure of 
the international community to provide adequate assistance to refugee 
hosting countries." 
Refugee camps can take various forms: planned or unplanned, self-
sustaining or entirely reliant on international aid, permanent or temporary, 
or hierarchical or self-governing, and they can vary in size and density. At 
the extreme are locations such as Kakuma Camp in Kenya, which is one 
of the oldest and largest refugee camps in the world. Today, with the 
financial and technical support of the UNHCR (although chronically 
inadequate), Kakuma houses almost 100,000 refugees, due in large part 
to the continuing conflict in neighboring Sudan. What was supposed to be 
a temporary entity has since become a permanent establishment, since 
31 
looming uncertainty about both security and economic opportunities in the 
home countries of refugees hinders their ability to return. 
Whatever the structure, there are a number of perceived advantages to 
warehousing refugees in camps. Rutinwa (1999) argues that because 
camps are supposed to be temporary entities until repatriation can occur, 
camps limit the potential for local settlement and integration and thereby 
increase the chances of promoting repatriation. He also argues for camps 
from the point of view of efficiency and transparency of aid delivery. For 
many, having these structures through which to ensure refugee care is the 
reason for the refugee camp at its most basic level. After all, most camps 
are established as temporary emergency measures when a crisis creates 
a sudden influx of refugees. It is arguable that there would be no other 
way to tend to the food, shelter, and health needs of so many people and 
to organize assistance in such a short period of time. This becomes 
especially important for the elderly or sick refugees who have no one left 
to turn to and rely on the medical care or free housing they receive in the 
camps to survive. Along those same lines, camps can also serve as a 
useful place for family reunifications to take place. 
From a rights and legal standards point of view, Jacobsen (2001) 
maintains that camps can provide security to refugees and facilitate the 
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monitoring of protection issues. Similarly, Jamal (2000) argues that camps 
in fact strengthen asylum by creating an international burden sharing and 
reducing host fatigue. From a security point of view, many African states 
take up a xenophobic position in arguing that camps serve to contain 
security problems introduced by refugees and to reduce conflict between 
host and refugees. For these states, camps can also reap economic 
benefits through the temporary influx of capital that comes from relief 
agencies running the camps. However, the key word there is 'temporary', 
and states often find themselves with less money and more waste if and 
once the camps are destroyed. 
Much of the literature focuses on security problems and xenophobia as 
reasons for the changing attitudes and receptivity towards the integration 
of refugees in host countries. "The growing xenophobia in some countries 
coincides with a democratization process in Africa which compels 
governments to take public opinion into account in the formulation of their 
refugee policies" (Rutinwa, 1999, p.15). Indeed, while refugees and 
migrants everywhere are often subjected to xenophobic hostility and 
scapegoated as the cause of crime, disease and a loss of jobs, Parker 
(2002) argues that urban migrants, in particular, are vulnerable to the 
effects of xenophobia due to their reliance on existing markets and public 
services. Evidence suggests that most urban refugees are in fact subject 
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to widespread discrimination by both the state and the local population, 
and also face persistent police abuse (Kagwanja, 2002; Verdirame, 1999). 
Thus, host governments are hesitant to promote local integration of 
refugees for fear of political unrest. Finally, Betts (2003) notes that if 
refugees are perceived as a cost, then it follows that containing their flow 
will be seen as a benefit. 
However, in recent years, there has been growing debate about the 
viability of refugee camps, particularly in protracted refugee situations 
where refugees will have been in these temporary establishments for often 
as long as 15 to 20 years. As Jamal (2000) points out: 
When a person flees for his or her life, a plastic 
shelter, a jerrycan of water and a container of 
maizemeal provided in a camp far from home may 
be exactly what that person needs. Five years on, 
though, and those same minimum standards that 
once protected a life will, if unchanged contrive to 
stifle it. (p. 3) 
Confinement to camps has been demonstrated to have a number of 
adverse effects on both refugees and hosts. Goyen et al. (2006) note that 
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establishing parallel services undermines local institutions by attracting the 
best staff to earn the higher salaries paid by humanitarian organizations. 
Harrell-Bond (2000) suggests that targeting relief to camps, surrounded by 
people often as poor or poorer than refugees is wasteful and also 
generates hostility from local communities since they can visibly see that 
they are not receiving as high quality services as those in the camp. The 
UNHCR's response to this criticism is to ensure that the standards of living 
of refugees within their camps are "harmonized" with those of the 
surrounding local population. However, their hands are left tied, and their 
promise unfulfilled, when the local population is close to starving, as is 
often the case. Making things worse is when a refugee camp closes, an 
event that is usually followed by the closure of all the physical 
infrastructure and services that accompanied it, including health clinics 
and schools. As a result, locals often feel the pain even more once the 
camp is shut down. 
Clark (1985) argues that life in camps adversely affects the mental health 
of already traumatized people, who often abandon social responsibilities in 
the face of the despair in their long-term prospects. Black (1994) suggests 
that congregating refugees strains local resources, including the 
environment, more so than does a dispersed population. Van Damme 
(1995) notes that camps represent a health risk by increasing exposure to 
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disease, with a clear link between the size of camps and mortality rates. 
Finally, Lischer (2005) also suggests that camps can become militarized, 
thereby heightening civil or international war. 
The negative impact of refugee camps can be felt even by refugees 
outside their borders. Chambers (1985) and Hansen (1981) argue that 
focusing assistance on refugees in camps ignores the needs of the 
majority of refugees who are self-settled. Harrell-Bond (2000) also notes 
that the popular media image of the refugee in a camp promotes the idea 
of the refugee as a problem, rather than as 'persons with problems', 
obscuring the reality that refugees are in fact ready to put their energies 
into productive work which could also benefit their hosts. As Black (1994) 
points out, refugee camps are also expensive. If they were temporary, as 
intended, financing would not be problematic because donors tend to pour 
money into crisis situations at their beginnings. Yet, as camps become 
permanent and as refugees become materially dependent without other 
means of income or survival, camps require the same emergency-situation 
funds to continually run the expanding structures. 
For the most part among proponents of camps, there seems to be a 
consensus that while they are not the best solution, huge influxes of 
refugees can completely overwhelm the capacity of the local population 
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and the infrastructure, wreaking havoc on the environment and socio-
economic system. As a result, local authorities sometimes have no choice 
but to seek separate sites for refugees. 
Given the protracted nature of many refugee situations in the world, few 
would argue for the complete elimination of camps. Indeed, for many 
refugees, the standard of living in camps is higher than those which the 
refugees left behind in their home countries. However, it must be 
acknowledged that whatever the reasons for or against warehousing 
refugees in camps, doing so fundamentally violates their rights to freedom 
of movement as guaranteed under international law, and there is a definite 
need to explore additional durable solutions, namely the possibilities of 
local integration and the promotion of self-reliance, which many such as 
Jacobsen (2001), Crisp (2003), and Hovil (2007) argue is possible under 
certain circumstances. Jacobsen (2001) in fact calls the local integration of 
refugees "the forgotten solution," which has rarely been systematically 
pursued, while Hovil (2007, p. 619) believes it points to "the potential for 
an alternative refugee development policy that can genuinely benefit both 
refugees and their hosts." Still, Crisp (2003) notes that while the principle 
of local integration is firmly established in international law, its practice to 
date has indeed been very limited. 
37 
5. UNDERSTANDING REFUGEE INTEGRATION 
This chapter outlines the various definitions and measures of refugee 
integration, the numerous factors that affect levels of refugee integration, 
and whether integration can be seen as a viable response to situations of 
protracted refugee crises. 
5.1 Definitions and measures of refugee integration 
According to Bascom (1995), the integration of refugees is one of the most 
poorly understood and under-researched topics in forced migration. 
Integration is defined by Harrell-Bond (1986, p. 7) as "a situation in which 
host and refugee communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same 
resources both economic and social with no greater mutual conflict than 
that which exists within the host community." Integration assumes that 
over time both new arrivals and the host population undergo change in 
response to each other, which presumes contact with one another. 
UNHCR defines three dimensions to the process of local integration: legal, 
economic and social/cultural. The legal dimension consists of the host 
state granting refugees a progressively wider range of rights and 
entitlements that are broadly in line with those enjoyed by its own people. 
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Bulcha (1988) defines economic integration as the process of securing 
work and becoming a part of the regularly employed labor force in a given 
society. He further argues that for refugees to be considered economically 
integrated in their country of asylum, they must have reached a level of 
material self-sufficiency. Finally, the social and cultural dimension of 
integration places responsibility on the refugee to make conscientious 
efforts to acclimatize themselves to the local environment and understand 
the new cultures and lifestyles in which they find themselves. Successful 
integration should be sustainable and benefit both the refugees and the 
local communities among whom they settle. 
Jacobsen (2001) says refugees are de facto integrated when they: (i) Are 
not in physical danger (and do not live under the threat of refoulement); (ii) 
Are not confined to camps or settlements, and have the right of return to 
their home country; (iii) Are able to sustain livelihoods through access to 
land or employment and can support themselves and their families; (iv) 
Have access to education or vocational training, health facilities, and 
housing; and (v) Are socially networked into the host community, so that 
intermarriage is common, ceremonies such as weddings and funerals are 
attended by everyone, and there is little distinction between refugees' and 
hosts' standard of living. It should be noted that integration is quite 
different from assimilation. For instance, in the case of Guinea, as cited by 
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Van Damme (1995), there was an opportunity to integrate assistance to 
refugees and local populations where this was feasible and cost-effective, 
as in the case of health provision and joint use of educational facilities. 
However, socio-economically and politically, the two populations 
maintained a clear and distinct identity. 
Working with refugees in Southeast Asia, Banki (2004) was able to 
determine a number of indicators that could be used to characterize and 
measure high levels of refugee integration. These are that: (i) Refugees 
are not restricted in their movements; (ii) Refugees own land or appear to 
have official access to it; (iii) Refugees participate in the local economy; 
(iv) Refugees are moving in the direction of self-sufficiency; (v) Refugees 
are able to utilize local services such as health facilities; (vi) Refugee 
children attend local schools; and (vii) Refugees are dispersed among the 
local population. 
5.2 Factors affecting refugee integration 
According to Banki (2004), there are several possible factors that explain 
differing levels of refugee integration in host countries. Importantly, not 
every factor will necessarily be prevalent in each and every refugee 
hosting country. Indeed, as Banki illustrated in her case study of Nepal, 
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Pakistan, and Kenya, there are often two or three factors that are the 
strongest in a country, with other factors remaining completely absent. 
Banki groups the factors into six different categories. She begins with the 
political - those factors that occur on a national level and typically take into 
account tactical security and internal, cross-country relations. These, she 
suggests, would be prevalent "when host governments are influenced by 
global opinion, interaction with sending countries, and geo-strategic 
issues" (2004, p. 5). From there, Banki moves on to security factors -
those which occur as a result of the host country's desire to protect its 
citizens from threats, or perceived threats, such as rebels or criminals. 
Next, Banki identifies economic factors, which take a market view of the 
situation. For instance, here refugees would be seen either as a valuable 
worker or a threat to their domestic counterparts. Social factors are also 
important, she says, such as those dealing with ethnicity, religion and 
language. Banki suggests that refugees who are "socially similar" are 
better able to integrate into their host communities. 
Physical factors are also important and Banki breaks these down into four 
classifications. First are geographic factors, including the ability of a 
refugee to easily cross the border. The more porous the border, the more 
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easily refugees can blend into the local population, she suggests. Second, 
are the physical or temporal factors. Here, the arrival time of the refugee 
as well as the amount of time a refugee spends in a host country are the 
two key determinants. Third, Banki gives weight to the size of the refugee 
population, both in proportion to the host country and in terms of how 
quickly the refugees arrived. The greater the influx of refugees into a host 
country, the more likely they will receive a hostile reception from 
governments and locals alike. Fourth, Banki identifies the individual 
refugee as an important physical factor in determining their own personal 
level of integration, suggesting that refugees are often able to integrate 
despite political, economic and social determinants. 
The sixth and final factor that Banki identifies as having a major 
significance on levels of refugee integration is the national legal system in 
which refugees find themselves. Banki notes that "legal factors can be 
presumed to prevail when official legal status and high levels of integration 
go hand in hand" (2004, p. 5). 
5.3 Integration as a viable alternative solution 
The local integration of refugees has to date predominantly been seen as 
a negative phenomenon, with arguments against it often overlapping with 
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those in favor of camps. Ferris (1993) claims that host governments are 
burdened, above anything else, with the task of balancing competing 
economic, political, ethnic, and humanitarian demands in the face of 
refugees. Further, he suggests that the two major reasons for host 
governments' resistance to local integration are security problems, in that 
they would lead to an increase in crime and conflict, and resource 
burdens. In addition to scarce resources such as housing and water, it is 
argued that refugees present competition for scarce economic 
opportunities, and further drain infrastructure such as schools and health 
facilities. 
Napier-Moore (2005) echoes these reasons, claiming that refugees are 
increasingly being seen as an economic and environmental burden on 
host-countries, which are themselves suffering from declining economies 
and growing populations. In addition, she claims that in the post-Cold war 
democratization process, some African leaders mobilized electoral support 
on the basis of xenophobic and anti-refugee sentiments. There is also a 
common fear on the part of many African states that those who are able to 
achieve economic stability in the host country will never return. 
Whether they arrive in massive numbers or not, many refugees find their 
own way within the host society and, whether in rural or urban areas, 
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become what have been termed as 'self-settled'. Many refugees have 
always been, as UNHCR describes them, 'spontaneously' or freely settled 
among the local population (although not necessarily integrated) and their 
survival has been as a result of their own efforts, the generosity of local 
hosts, and the extent to which they could gain access to employment in 
the formal or informal economic sectors and share in the health, education 
and other services intended for nationals. 
However, in order for local integration to be encouraged as a viable 
alternative to refugee camps in protracted situations, both host 
governments and their citizens must be convinced that it is in their benefit 
to do so. As Crisp (2004) suggests, simply calling on states to respect 
international law is not only unlikely to be effective, but is also hypocritical 
as the world's more prosperous states continue to both close their own 
doors to refugees and reduce foreign aid. 
In recent years, an increasing amount of research has come forward with 
examples of the ways in which integration can be beneficial to the 
economies of recipient countries. Kuhlman (1994) suggests there is a 
general agreement from empirical research that a development approach 
rather than relief is crucial for ensuring that the survival energies of 
refugees are used as resources for development. By failing to recognize 
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the resources which refugees themselves bring to the situation, the relief 
model inhibits the mobilization of these resources and networks for the 
benefit of both the refugees and the local economy. As Jacobsen (2002, p. 
1) has noted, "When refugees are allowed to gain access to resources, 
have freedom of movement and can work alongside their hosts to pursue 
productive lives, they will be less dependent on aid, and better able to 
overcome the sources of tension and conflict in their host communities." 
Jacobsen (2002) claims that refugees have a multiplier effect by 
expanding the capacity and productivity of the receiving area's economy 
through trade and the growth of markets. They bring material wealth from 
their home countries, ranging from gold to trucks to computers. New 
markets spring up and many goods can be found that were unattainable in 
the region before. Self-settled refugees can provide economic inputs for 
the receiving community, both at the local level when they first arrive, and 
over time, as refugees move deeper into the host country. When they are 
permitted to participate in the local economy, she says, refugees 
contribute their human capital, in the form of education, new technologies 
and skills, or needed labor. Some host countries have benefited 
economically from refugees as a result of agricultural expansion or 
intensification made possible by refugee labor, as Kok (1989) shows in 
eastern Sudan, or new farming practices. Local farmers can benefit when 
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where is increased demand by refugees for local food as opposed to 
unfamiliar or unwanted food aid. 
Hagen (1980) found that Tibetans fleeing to Nepal brought their carpet-
making skills. Today, carpet making is the largest foreign exchange earner 
in Nepal, exceeding tourism, and the industry was begun immediately 
upon their arrival so there was little need for a relief phase. Hovil (2002) 
found that self-settled Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda were not 
only self-sufficient but also frequently and actively engaged in their local 
economies. "Although technically they do not exist, they are living, 
working, paying taxes, and contributing to the local economy in the 
district," she writes (p. 23). So, too, were Liberian refugees in Ghana 
successfully able to embrace entrepreneurship in an urban context. Here, 
Dick (2002) shows that they have created tailoring shops, clothing stores, 
and beauty salons, sell clean water, offer information technology (IT) and 
typing training and have become a benefit not only to themselves but also 
to their communities. These examples echo the findings of Chan and 
Christie (1995), who claim that refugees, particularly in an urban setting, 
typically respond to their situation by creating their own ethnic capitalism, 
or what they call "ethnic entrepreneurship". 
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Finally, refugees also attract remittances into their host countries. 
Estimates of remittances were in the order of US$318 billion in 2007, up 
from US$297 billion in 2006. Over US$240 billion of this went to 
developing countries, making up a third of total financial flows to those 
countries. The top five recipients of remittances were India (US$27 billion), 
China (US$26 billion), Mexico (US$25 billion), the Philippines (US$17 
billion), and France (US$12 billion) (Jensen and Kletzer, 2008). In 2008, 
remittances to Rwanda totaled US$200 million (Orozco, 2009). 
The common fear that those who are able to achieve economic stability in 
the host country will never return is two-faced. On the one hand, 
Sepulveda et al. (2006) suggest that people impoverished by an economy 
based on relief will be unable to return without enormous investment in 
their economic rehabilitation, while those able to acquire the resources in 
exile are likely to return voluntarily when conditions are improved. Crisp 
(2003) suggests that refugees who have led a productive life in exile, 
received an education, developed practical skills, and accumulated some 
resources may actually be more willing and better equipped to go home 
and contribute to the reconstruction of their country than those who have 
languished in camps for years, surviving on minimal levels of humanitarian 
assistance. Hovil (2007) also found that Sudanese refugees in Uganda 
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would take their dead back to Sudan for burial, a clear indication that they 
themselves intended to return. 
On the other hand, Phillips (2003, p. 16) found that "While Afghan 
refugees were seen by many as a burden on the economy, their rapid 
repatriation from Pakistan has caused a sharp downturn in the local 
economy, with many businesses recording severe losses and facing 
possible closure after the massive exodus." Repatriation might have been 
detrimental, but it nonetheless demonstrates the positive economic impact 
of these refugees, which are often only acknowledged after they leave an 
area. While xenophobic and national security fears also may well be true 
in the short term, Mandaville (1999) suggests that these problems would 
likely subside over time: 
Mixed marriages (between forced migrants and 
hosts and among various migrant groups), 
business enterprises engaging locals and 
migrants, the creation of new linguistic idioms and 
religious organizations, and the diffusion of ideas 
will necessarily have transformative effects on all 
involved, (p. 653) 
Major barriers to refugee integration include: lack of employment, racism 
and discrimination, inability to speak the language, and the lack of 
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recognition of qualifications and experience. According to Crisp (2003), the 
potential for successful local integration and the creation of sustainable 
refugee livelihoods exist: where refugees have established strong social 
and economic links to their country of asylum; where they are granted 
legal status; and where they move into an area that is populated by people 
of the same ethnic origin. He demonstrates that with the proper support of 
the government, locals and fellow refugees, they can become a success. 
Large numbers of refugees throughout Africa have spontaneously settled 
in urban areas and have managed to support themselves without 
international assistance. All that is required, according to Dick (2002a), is 
a longer-term perspective: 
It would be useful to assume that refugees will stay 
for a few years and to make plans to utilize their 
presence. If this assumption proves false...nothing 
has been lost. But if refugees do stay on, 
community development efforts would be a better 
alternative to repeating the same scenario of 
funding years of relief that only perpetuate refugee 
dependency, (p. 28) 
Jacobsen (2001) provides a thorough examination of the interests of all 
the various stakeholders involved in promoting self-sufficiency and local 
integration of urban refugees. With the successful creation of partnerships, 
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international donors, NGOs and the UNHCR will see a better use of their 
relief funds and the protection of refugee rights, while host governments 
and the local population will see increased local economic development, a 
reduced burden on community resources and the environment, and 
improved relations with both donors and the sending country. Also 
important, the refugees themselves will have greater security and 
protection of rights, while becoming self-supporting. Crisp (2003) admits 
that the political climate is not ideal for such an endeavor at the moment, 
but the principle that refugees should enjoy productive lives and contribute 
to the development of the areas where they have settled needs to be 
revived. 
5.4 Urban refugees and integration 
As the world's urban population grows, so too does the problem of urban 
refugees and how best to deal with them. In Africa, specifically, despite 
still largely being characterized by rural agricultural production, the 
continent has witnessed the highest urban growth rates of anywhere in the 
world (Sadik, 1996). Still, while half of all the world's refugees live in urban 
areas, seven out of ten refugees in sub-Saharan Africa reside in camps 
(UNHCR, 2009). 
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Current research suggests that urban refugees are not necessarily as 
disadvantageous to host countries as they are overwhelmingly made out 
to be. According to Ndege, Kagwanja and Odiyo (2001), urban refugees, 
by virtue of their origins, typically have greater education and skills than 
their counterparts living in refugee camps and thus deserve to be handled 
differently from camp refugees. Taking what knowledge of the market 
many of them had from their home country, they are often able to do 
productive work and boost the local economy. Despite receiving no 
support from the government in terms of education, healthcare, shelter 
etc., many of these refugees go on to become successful entrepreneurs. 
Similarly, Sommers (2001) and Kuhlman (1994) argue that it is often the 
most entrepreneurial and educated that choose to risk violating the law 
and attempt to make a living in urban areas. These views echo the 
findings of Weaver (1985) and Waldron and Hasci (1995) who propose 
that urban refugees possessed skills such as shop-keeping and 
artisanship from their lives in their previous countries, while many others 
were also members of various professional bodies in their home countries. 
As Landau (2004) suggests, the most significant and under-explored 
themes in the body of research surrounding this topic remain twofold: (i) 
under what conditions particular outcomes are likely; and (ii) the impact of 




This chapter is divided into seven sections, covering the aims and 
techniques of the collection and analysis of data for this study. An attempt 
has also been made to discuss the justification for using such methods, 
the reliability and validity of the data, as well as the limitations of the study. 
Both primary and secondary data were used in this research. 
6.1 Research Aims 
The purpose of this research is to contribute to the body of literature that 
examines the current state of the world's refugees. It aims to draw 
attention to issues of forced migration and, more specifically, to those who 
suffer from its effects, among the relevant actors both in Rwanda and 
abroad. It intends to assist in creating a better understanding of the situation 
faced by urban refugees among all of the local population, NGOs, national 
policy makers, and the broader research community. It hopes that in 
identifying the survival strategies and levels of integration of select urban 
refugees and their causal factors in Rwanda, the viability of integration as 
one possible alternative solution to their plight will be assessed. 
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It is within this context that this research investigates the livelihood 
strategies of a small number of refugees who have chosen to settle 
outside of refugee camps in Rwanda. More specifically, it aims to 
determine their levels of self-sufficiency and integration, and the causal 
factors behind that integration. To date, no scholarly study has been 
completed that looks into the status, conditions, livelihoods or integration 
levels of urban refugees in Rwanda. Thus, not only will this research be the 
first of its kind, it hopes to better inform future studies relating to the plight of 
urban refugees in Africa and around the world and, consequentially, the 
related policy-making processes. 
It is not to suggest that integration should be an exclusive alternative to 
refugee camps as a solution for dealing with protracted refugee crises. 
Rather, given the very protracted nature of the crises and the 
accompanying challenges facing both the refugee hosting countries and 
the refugees themselves, it is the goal of this research to offer alternatives, 
to examine those complimentary durable solutions that are not only 
necessary, but are also possible. 
6.2 Conceptual Design 
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"Doctors know that lots of things can go wrong, and that a particular 
symptom such as high fever might reflect dozens, or hundreds, of 
underlying causes" (Sachs, 2005, p. 79). 
In chapters 4 and 5, various responses to the global refugee crisis were 
examined. What that examination revealed, more than anything else, is 
that the crisis is a very complex phenomenon, one that reflects a myriad of 
potential obstacles to an individual's freedom of opportunity. However, 
while generalizations might be necessary in theory and helpful in practice 
to a certain extent, individual assessments of specific country contexts are 
indispensable. Jeffrey Sachs compares the required work with that of a 
medical doctor who needs to perform a "differential diagnosis" of the 
countless potential causes of an illness (2005, p. 83). 
This research begins with an analysis of the country environment, focusing 
in particular on the intertwined history and origins of conflict in both 
Rwanda and the DRC. It then presents a picture of Rwanda today, 
examining the country's poverty context and basic elements of human 
development. Finally, it looks at the refugee context, examining the policy 
framework for their treatment, including the subsidiary roles played by all 
of the Government of Rwanda, the UNHCR, and NGOs. 
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6.3 Research Method 
It is to this end that this research focuses on the case of urban refugees in 
Rwanda. According to UNHCR estimates, there are approximately 2,547 
officially registered urban refugees in Kigali, Rwanda (UNHCR, 2008). If 
one were to include the number of refugees living in Kigali that are not 
officially classified as "urban", that figure would increase considerably. 
Twenty refugees living in Kigali participated in this study. While all of the 
participants had received official refugee status, only half had been given 
the necessary legal permission to reside in Kigali and out of the camp 
confines. The other half was living in Kigali without the actual knowledge 
or permission of the Government, and therefore without the support of the 
UNHCR. This diversity allowed for a closer study of the impact of official 
channels of support provided to urban refugees, as those living in Kigali 
illegally received little to no official assistance. 
The sample population was diverse in age, ranging from a 17-year-old 
student too young to remember why his family first fled the DRC as 
refugees, to a 43-year-old man for whom the memories of war were all too 
fresh. Capturing information from a wide age range of participants was 
ideal for this study in order to better understand the different levels of self-
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sufficiency and integration that refugees of various age groups had 
achieved. 
Of the participants interviewed, five were female and fifteen were male. 
This discrepancy can be explained largely due to the method of data 
collection. Participants were found using a non-probability snowball 
technique. Because of the stigma associated with being a refugee that 
currently exists in Kigali, it was difficult to locate participants who were 
comfortable speaking on the subject. Instead, once a few cooperative 
participants were found, they then referred the researcher to other urban 
refugees they knew of. Because of the trust that existed between the 
participant who had already been interviewed and those they were 
referring this researcher to, they were much more willing to cooperate in 
the study. As a result of friends referring friends, most of whom were male, 
that necessarily tilted the scale of this research in their favor. Yet, the 
participation of the five females in this study still provided rich insight into 
the differences in their plight and strategies. 
All of the participants in this study were refugees who originated from the 
DRC and fled throughout different times in their country's tragic and 
turbulent history. This is explained by two factors. Firstly, as mentioned 
above, the snowballing technique of finding participants strongly biased 
57 
this study towards those refugees who were friends, and who shared 
something in common, namely their country of origin. Secondly, due to the 
fact that more than two-thirds of Rwanda's urban refugees originate from 
the DRC, it was inevitable that this bias would exist. This bias, however, 
could be seen in a positive light since any findings that arise from this 
study can more plausibly be applied to the majority of Rwanda's other 
urban refugees. 
This research was carried out in the form of semi-structured interviews. 
Participants were provided with a sheet of questions (see Annex I) and 
given time to reflect on their answers. Once the participant was ready to 
proceed, the researcher would read the questions aloud - one by one -
allowing for time to respond between each question. Within the responses, 
participants would often raise other issues, ask their own questions, or 
provide answers to questions never asked of them. It was in fact within 
this unscripted part of the research that the richest and most telling 
insights were revealed. 
The benefits of conducting this research through semi-structured 
interviews were many. Firstly, as mentioned above, the informal nature of 
the interview allowed participants to feel comfortable enough to volunteer 
information that was never even asked of them. Secondly, by keeping the 
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interview a private matter, conducted one individual at a time, participants 
did not have to worry about possible repercussions of them being truthful, 
which would have been a major concern in other formats, such as a focus 
group. Thirdly, by conducting oral interviews as opposed to written 
questionnaires, this research was able to tap into stories that otherwise 
would have been missed. Several of the participants had little to no 
education and forcing them to write their responses would have been 
severely constrained those responses. Moreover, all of the participants 
come from a rich oral tradition, making them much more comfortable in 
speaking than writing their answers. As a result of using semi-structured 
interviews, the research was ordered enough to keep focus, but flexible 
and comfortable enough to gain rare insight. 
Interviews were conducted in a place of choosing of the individual 
participants. In more than two-thirds of the cases, this meant at the home 
of the participant. In the rest of the cases, interviews were conducted 
either at the private home of the researcher or in a quiet local cafe. In all 
cases, participants were encouraged to choose a location where they 
could speak freely and comfortably. This would ensure that their answers 
were as open as possible and thus valuable for research purposes. 
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Interviews were recorded by note-taking only. Initially, this research 
proposed using audio-recording to capture the interviews, but it was 
quickly discovered that few participants felt comfortable with being 
recorded. Even after being reassured that their interviews were completely 
confidential, several respondents still noted fears of having their interviews 
discovered by a third party and played over the radio (a harsh reminder of 
the way in which radio was used as the primary communication tool in 
instigating the 1994 genocide). 
In most of the interviews, French was the language of use. Both the 
informed consent form and survey questions were translated into French 
in order to ensure participants were fully aware of what they were agreeing 
to. The researcher asked questions in French and took notes in French 
exactly as the participants replied. Translation was done afterwards in 
order to ensure that no information was mistakenly translated in a rush 
during the actual interview. While the researcher felt confident enough 
conducting the interview in French, a translator was also on hand. The 
translator was also fluent in Kiswahili, the other dominant language of all 
of the participants, providing an extra assurance that participants would be 
able to express themselves however they felt most comfortable. The 
translator, a student at the Universite Libre du Kigali, signed a 
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confidentiality form so as to ensure the participants' responses were kept 
anonymous. 
In order to improve the quality of this study and to supplement the findings 
of the primary data, secondary sources were also widely used. This 
included both published and unpublished sources from journals, articles, 
books, official reports and policy documents, and Internet sources. 
6.4 Qualitative versus Quantitative Method 
According to Glesne and Peshkin (1992), the research question should 
define the research method. In following, Brannen (1992) notes there are 
three kinds of methodological approaches: qualitative, quantitative, and 
mixed. The qualitative method is believed to be the most useful approach 
when examining a problem deeply, while the quantitative method is useful 
when examining a problem widely (Denzin, 1989). Similarly, Minichiello 
(1995) explains that the qualitative method should be used when 
attempting to uncover the thoughts, perceptions, and feelings of 
participants. As such, the sample of participants need not be large as the 
goal of the study is to explore a topic in-depth rather than seek a 
representative sample of the population. Analysis of data is carried out as 
narratives rather than by numerical values, with emphasis placed on 
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process and meanings rather than quantity, intensity or frequency (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1998). Conversely, the quantitative method emphasizes 
representativeness, placing the focus on a large representative sample 
size, and using questionnaires and statistical analysis of numerical data. 
The qualitative method is argued to be more flexible and reflective 
(McCracken, 1988), while also allowing important dimensions to emerge 
from the data analysis without supposing in advance what those 
dimensions will be (Quinn, 1980). Its weaknesses, however, include the 
subjectivity of results obtained, and the difficulty of replicating qualitative 
studies. In addition, the qualitative method is not as useful as its 
counterparts when making generalizations and predictions (Patton, 1990; 
McCracken, 1988). Conversely, the quantitative method is said to allow 
for generalizations and the uncovering of broad trends, and can more 
easily be replicated or compared with other quantitative data. However, 
the approach also suffers from criticism of over-generalization and little 
flexibility or reflexivity (Brannen, 1992). 
In light of the above discussion, this study chose to make use of both the 
qualitative and quantitative methods, in an approach called triangulation 
(Bryman, 1992). Here, in what Bryman terms "multiple operationism," the 
validity of the study's findings is enhanced by the use of more than one 
62 
method of data collection. Despite suffering criticism on the grounds that 
tallying different data sources does not necessarily lead to correct 
inferences (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995), others have noted that that 
varying characteristics of quantitative and qualitative approaches make it 
feasible to combine them into a research work (Mikkelsen, 1995). 
In this study, qualitative methods were used to interpret deeper and more 
comprehensive relationships between variables analyzed by using 
quantitative techniques. Quantitative techniques were used to present 
data on socio-demographic information while the qualitative method was 
used to analyze data on the various livelihoods. The choice of both 
methods, in this way, has been influenced by the nature of this study's 
research problem. 
As stated previously, this research aims at understanding the livelihood 
strategies and integration levels of a sample of urban refugees in Kigali. 
Thus, the best way to capture the unique and broad strategies and 
experiences of these refugees is by using both qualitative and quantitative 
data. By using a combination of methods, this study will have the 
advantage of the deep description and insight into the lives of respondents 
by qualitative methods, as well as the potential to contribute to statistical 
reliability, as with regards to the demographic background of participants. 
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6.5 Ethical Considerations 
It was this researcher's top priority to keep the identities of all participants 
confidential, and their responses anonymous. Interviews were conducted 
in private locations or discreet public locations at the discretion of the 
participant. Participants were informed as to the purpose of the research 
and the desired outcome. Participants were also well-informed of their 
rights and duties prior to the interview both through an informed consent 
form and a verbal explanation by the researcher. Participants were aware 
that they could withdraw from the study at any time without penalty and 
that their participation was completely voluntary. They were also made 
aware of the fact that there would be no financial compensation for their 
participation. 
During the interview, the researcher stayed as neutral as possible, 
allowing the participant to speak freely without interruption or challenge. 
No discrimination was made on the base of age, color, ethnic group, 
gender, race, religion, or socio-economic status. The translator was asked 
to step in only on the request of either the researcher or the participant. 
Otherwise, he remained a silent observer to the process. Notes were 
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taken without the names of any participants, instead keeping track of 
individual participants by assigning numbers. 
Following the interview, all notes were placed in individually sealed 
envelopes marked by number only and placed in a secure safety box, the 
code of which was known only to the researcher. Participants were given 
the contact information of both the researcher and supervisor in case they 
had any concerns about the use of their responses. A letter of appreciation 
was also given to participants a week after their initial interview, again 
encouraging them to contact the researcher if they had suffered any 
negative or traumatic experiences following the interview. 
As many potential risks as possible were anticipated in advance of the 
interview. Because refugees are a vulnerable group and have necessarily 
lived through a traumatic experience, it was conceivable that interviews 
could further traumatize participants by making them relive their past. 
However, it was found that this risk has generally diminished with the 
amount of time each refugee spent in Rwanda. In addition, the researcher 
has had significant previous experience working with refugees and victims 
of war, and has received training on Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome and 
how to sensitively deal with any related symptoms that might have arisen. 
A counselor's number was on hand in case their services were required. 
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However, none of the participants appeared to experience trauma or 
disturbance during the interview, and a counselor was not necessary. 
A further potential risk identified was that of stigmatization of participants 
within their own communities, which could occur as a result of their 
participation in this research. Thus, participants were well informed of the 
purpose of the research and their roles in advance of the interview. They 
were also allowed to choose the location of their interview, choosing a 
place where they would feel secure and know that their information would 
be kept private. 
6.6 Limitations 
Given the extended period of time the researcher was able to spend in 
Rwanda prior to and during the interview period, many limitations were 
overcome. The researcher was able to become familiar with the country's 
geography, institutions, cultural rituals, and even acquire basic Kiswahili 
and Kinyarwanda skills, which would often serve as a good 'ice-breaker' 
with participants. The researcher was also able to remain flexible in terms 
of scheduling interviews. 
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Still, the research did suffer from three major limitations. Firstly, because 
of the stigma that is associated with being a refugee in Kigali, as well as 
the fact that many had not been granted the legal right to leave their 
camps, it was difficult to locate participants who were not worried about 
their involvement in the research. As a result, and as previously mentioned 
in Chapter 6.3, the research was biased towards male participants who 
were acquaintances. Female participants willing to be involved were more 
difficult to locate. Prior to starting the research, it was hoped that this 
research would have a sample of 50 percent women, but that proved 
difficult without much more time being spent in Rwanda. Still, the five 
females who participated in this research provided a valuable contribution, 
resulting in more dynamic and representative findings. 
A second limitation arose due to the economic status of the participants. 
Because the majority of the approached prospects were living well below 
the poverty line, many of them saw the opportunity to participate in this 
research as a chance to make money and as a result, demanded financial 
compensation from the researcher. Thus, while almost 30 potential 
participants were initially identified for the study, only 20 agreed to 
participate when it was confirmed that they would receive no financial 
compensation for their involvement. Despite not having participated, their 
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decisions are nevertheless telling and reflect the reality of their situations 
and the financial difficulties they continue to face. 
A final limitation was the inability of the researcher to expand the scope of 
this study to include interviews with members of the host community. As 
integration has already been defined as a two-way process involving both 
refugees and their hosts, this study is necessarily weakened by not having 
examined integration from the perspective of the host community. Still, 
given the targeted nature of this research on the actions taken by refugees 
in response to their situations, it was felt that this weakness would not 
detract from the strength of the final argument. 
6.7 Analysis 
In order to analyze the collected information, it is necessary to return to 
Chapter 5, where we looked at Banki's and Jacobsen's dissection of what 
refugee integration means in actuality, how it can be measured, and what 
the causal factors are behind it (see Table 2). It is against a combination of 
these indicators that the interviews conducted in this study are analyzed. 
TABLE 2: INDICATORS OF REFUGEE INTEGRATION 
Banki (2004) Jacobsen (2001) 
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• Refugees have freedom of movement 
• Refugees have official access to land 
• Refugees participate in the local economy 
• Refugees are moving towards self-
sufficiency 
• Refugees have access to local schools 
and services 
• Refugees are dispersed among local 
population 
• Refugees are under no physical 
threat 
• Refugees are not confined to 
camps 
• Refugees are able to sustain 
livelihoods (access to land, jobs), 
and support themselves 
• Refugees have access to 
education / health services / 
housing 
• Refugees are socially networked 
In order to determine the extent to which this sample of Rwanda's urban 
refugees are integrated into their host communities, this study thus 
proposes the following the following criteria (see Table 3). 
TABLE 3: CRITERIA OF REFUGEE INTEGRATION FOR THIS STUDY 
Legal Dimension 
Refugees are not restricted in their movements 
Refugees have the right to land, jobs 
Refugees have the right to health and education services 
Economic Dimension 
Refugees have access to jobs 
Refugees have access to health and education services 
Refugees are able to support themselves or have prospects of soon being able to 
Social / Cultural Dimension 
Refugees are dispersed among the local population 
Using these criteria, this research will propose to identify the level of 
integration of the urban refugees sampled in this study. Once the level of 
integration is identified, it will be necessary to assess the causes of that 
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integration. Thus, this thesis will return to Banki's (2004) assessment of 
factors affecting refugee integration (see Table 4). 
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• Timing of arrival 
• Size of refugee population 
• Individual traits 
Source: Banki (2004) 
Taking into account both the determining factors on the side of the 
government and refugees, this research will attempt to prescribe an 
explanation for the levels of integration of this group of urban refugees in 
Rwanda, and identify the challenges and prospects for integration in the 
future. 
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7. RWANDA'S URBAN REFUGEES - A CASE STUDY 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first two sections will detail 
the origins of conflict both in Rwanda and the DRC, two countries whose 
histories are so intertwined that both need to be understood 
simultaneously. The third section presents a picture of Rwanda today in 
order to better understand the environment in which the respondents of 
this study find themselves. Finally, the data of this research will be 
presented. 






Figure I: Map of Rwanda 
Source: (CIA, 2009) 
As Waller (1997, p. 3) wrote, "If 
you think of Africa - as many 
people do - as a flat, brown, 
sandy land with few trees and 
little rain, Rwanda comes as a 
shock to the senses." This small, 
land-locked country in East Africa 
covers 26,338km2, and is 
bordered by the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, 
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Uganda, and Burundi. Figure 1 indicates Rwanda's location in Africa. 
Despite its small size, Rwanda's history is as rich and complex as the flora 
and fauna that cover it. 
Pre-colonial Rwanda consisted of three loosely defined ethnic groups -
the Tutsi, the Hutu, and the Twa. Instead of being three distinctly separate 
groups, however, Rwanda's rich oral history suggests that there were in 
fact 18 neighboring family clans, to which the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa all 
belonged. Sharing a common language, common culture, and many of the 
same traditions and customs, the groupings were more so socio-economic 
classifications within each clan (Nolting, 2003). Despite the pastoralist 
Tutsi comprising the political elite, there was in fact little distinction 
between the groups. Intermarriages were common, and the groups joined 
together to fight against neighboring clans. 
However, these distinctions would become more pronounced after 1907, 
the year Belgium invaded Rwanda. The resulting transfer of power would 
have a lasting impact on the societal and developmental trajectory of the 
small country. Thereafter, Belgian's Albert I gave preferential treatment 
towards the Tutsi minority through methods of unfair tax collection, forced 
labor and unequal access to education. Rwanda's social fabric slowly 
began tearing apart. Identity cards that drew ethnic lines according to 
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physical measurements and factors of wealth sealed the deal. The fluid 
nature of Rwanda's ethnic divisions had been transformed into a rigid and 
final system of discrimination that would ultimately lead to conflict and 
violence (Magnarella, 2002). 
The end of World War II might have served as the catalyst for Rwanda 
gaining its independence in 1962, but it was a fact that indeed changed 
very little. Under its new leader, Gregoire Kayibanda, the country 
witnessed an increasingly repressive one-party state and the 
strengthening of ethnic divisions and discrimination. This resulted in the 
first significant wave of Tutsi fleeing to neighboring countries, including the 
DRC. Between 1959 and 1994, there were in fact seven large-scale 
massacres in Rwanda (IPA, 2004). 
Promise of hope and reconciliation finally came in 1973, when a coup 
d'etat established Juvenal Habyarimana as leader, one who was willing to 
push for public reforms that even saw the troubled economy rebound. Still, 
overpopulation, the decline in world market prices for coffee and tea, and 
continuing ethnic tensions hampered significant progress (HRW, 1999). 
In the meantime, the problem was becoming a regional affair. Rwanda's 
Tutsi refugees continued to struggle for survival and self-sufficiency in 
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neighboring Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and the DRC. Tanzania's Julius 
Nyerere adopted a lenient policy towards them, but there were other 
leaders, including Uganda's Milton Obote, who considered the refugees, 
"a temporary phenomenon who would eventually return to Rwanda" 
(Murison, 2003, p. 4). In response, the Rwandan refugees started to 
organize themselves. 
In 1990, after forming the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) with the support 
of the Ugandan military, refugees based in Uganda launched their first 
invasion of Rwanda in the northeast in 1990, an event that coincided with 
the collapse in global coffee prices and increasing global pressures for 
democratic reform, the combination of which forced Habyarimana to sign a 
peace accord with the RPF three years later. In addition to the repatriation 
of refugees, the Arusha Accords committed the Government to the rule of 
law, pluralism, human rights, and the integration of RPF troops into the 
national armed forces. 
Still, neither the Tutsis nor Hutus were satisfied with the agreement, and 
with a weak mandate and few forces in-country, the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) had little ability to enforce the 
ceasefire. The Hutu, in particular, began a campaign of hate speeches 
and propaganda that portrayed the Tutsis as foreigners who had no right 
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living in Rwanda (HRW, 2006). Next, they began to distribute weapons 
and train military groups, including the Interahamwe, the results of became 
well known to the world albeit too late. 
On April 6, 1994, with the shooting down of Habyarimana's plane over 
Kigali, Rwanda's genocide had begun. Within a few hours, Hutu extremists 
had set up road blocks throughout the city and begun to implement a plan 
for massacre that had been three years in the making (IPA, 2004). Over 
the next 100 days, everyone from political opponents to UNAMIR 
peacekeepers were systematically targeted and killed while the 
international community resisted getting involved. The result was more 
than a million deaths, three million exiled, and one million internally 
displaced (Government of Rwanda, 2002). Finally, RPF troops coming 
down from their base in Uganda managed to invade and stop the 
genocide, declaring total victory on July 14, 1994. 
A transitional Government of National Unity under President Pasteur 
Bizimungu was established, but the challenges it faced were immense. An 
estimated 78 per cent of the population was now poor (Evans et al., 2006), 
not to mention the destruction of infrastructure and negative impacts on 
health, education, and agriculture that had resulted from the conflict. Even 
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worse was the social and psychological destruction, resulting in a society 
even more divided and distrustful than before. 
In 2003, former RPF Major General Paul Kagame was elected as 
President and set to work reintegrating those who had been displaced or 
exiled, liberalizing the economy, promoting education and health, and, 
perhaps most importantly, launching a process of national reconciliation. 
However, the exiled genocidaires continued to pose a threat outside of 
Rwanda's borders, particularly regrouping in the refugee camps in Goma 
and Bukavu. War also continued to rage inside the borders of the DRC, 
when newly installed President Laurent-Desire Kabila turned against his 
Rwandan and Ugandan allies, sparking a continental conflict that saw 
seven countries supporting various local armed groups for a piece of 
Congolese territory and wealth (HRW, 2004). 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully delve into the origin of the 
Rwandan people. Still, the country's pre- and post- colonial history 
remains relevant in the context of today's economy and Government, 
which has taken upon itself the task of establishing a new national identity 
marked by unity and "a common origin" (Republic of Rwanda, 2004, p. 
18), something which necessarily impacts the country's national refugee 
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policy and national attitudes towards refugees. In addition, because the 
plight of Rwanda's refugees ironically stem from conflict that emerged 
within its own borders decades ago, it is necessary to look at the two 
countries' conflicts with an understanding of the other. 
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7.2 Democratic Republic of Congo: A fragmented state 
The DRC is a sprawling country 
of 2.34 million square kilometers 
home to 64.7 million people, 
making it the fourth most 
populous country in Africa. With 
hundreds of different ethnic 
groups within its borders and 
over 242 languages spoken, the 
RC represents one of the most 
Source: (CIA, 2009) challenging countries from a 
governance perspective, something which has been reflected throughout 
its turbulent history. 
When people talk about the state in Lingala, only one of the five national 
languages of the DRC, they often say, "Leta exali lisusu te," meaning that 
it has ceased to exist (Gakunzi, 2004). This demonstrates the degree to 
which the Congolese feel their state has failed them. Today, the DRC's 
internal structures are weak, and have been since most of its residents 




seen the death of over 3.5 million civilians - more than any other conflict 
since World War II (Congo's Hope, 2005). 
Populated as early as 10,000 years ago, there were various ethnic groups 
who occupied the land and organized themselves into small kingdoms and 
republics (Davidson, 1992). King Leopold II of Belgium originally took 
control of the region in 1885, calling it the Congo Free State and ruling it 
with a brutal regime of exploitation, coercing the local population into slave 
labor. Leopold eventually gave control over the state to Belgium in 1908, 
but a regime of paternalistic colonialism and extreme resource exploitation 
continued. During the 1950s, a nationalist movement began to spread 
throughout the DRC, which eventually led to the declaration of an 
independent Republic of Congo under the leadership of President 
Kasavubu. However, the abrupt nature of the transition from a colonial 
state to an independent state meant, again, little more than a change in 
leadership. 
In addition to a history of brutal colonial rule, the DRC has been weakened 
by two factors: (i) the process of state formation; and (ii) the end of the 
Cold War. When the colonial powers drew the national borders, and 
surrounded the DRC by nine different countries, they were setting the 
stage for instability throughout the region. In fact, Leslie (1993) suggests 
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that the externally-imposed borders meant that the DRC never had 
territorial legitimacy and attempts by Mobutu to create a national identity in 
fact failed, leaving the country ethnically divided. 
The US had also set out to buy influence in the region, installing Mobutu 
as army chief and eventually supporting him in his coup against the 
president at the time, Patrice Lumumba. For over 32 years, the Mobutist 
state was able to compensate for its lack of internal legitimacy by drawing 
huge dividends from its international status as a staunch ally of the US in 
Africa. But, when the end of the Cold War meant the US no longer needed 
anti-communist allies, the DRC suffered a massive decline in levels of 
bilateral aid (Van de Walle, 2001). In fact, bilateral aid to the state went 
from US$823 million in 1990 to US$178 in 1993. 
During the Mobutu regime, he enacted a number of policies that ultimately 
limited the state's ability to provide security and goods to its citizens. For 
example, the 'Zairianization' campaign launched by Mobutu in the 1970s 
involved the nationalization of over 1,500 foreign-owned companies. The 
majority of these foreign-owned companies were expected to hand over 
their profits to influential members of Mobutu's regime, essentially opening 
the door to rampant government corruption (Matthews and Solomon, 
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2001). By the end of Mobutu's rule, it was estimated that he stole 
approximately US$5.5 billion from the state 
The World Bank estimates that the country's Gross National Product 
(GNP) fell by four percent each year since 1970. Real wages were one-
tenth the level they were at the end of colonial rule. Ninety percent of the 
country's roads were unusable due to state neglect, leaving less than 
1,000 miles of paved road in a country that has a land area of over 2 
million square kilometers. In fact, only 15 percent of the roads inherited 
from Belgian colonial rule were still passable 25 years later (Reno, 1998). 
Public transportation was virtually nonexistent and while the state leaders 
were increasing their wealth, it was at the expense of the rest of the 
population, of which over 80 percent live under the poverty line. 
As a result, conflict has ravaged the country almost continually since 
independence. Secessionist rebellion and civil war occurred between 1964 
and 1965, and again between 1977 and 1978. The replacement of Mobutu 
by Laurent Kabila in 1997 has witnessed years of internal fighting between 
Kabila's supporters and supporters of the Rassemblement Congolais 
Democratique (RCD). The degree of ethnic strife in the country is evident 
from the 1996 attempt by Tutsi rebels to capture part of Eastern Zaire, and 
the capital of Kinshasa the following year. Several bordering countries also 
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got involved in the conflict, including Rwanda and Uganda on the side of 
the RCD and Angola and Zimbabwe on Kabila's side. By 1999, six African 
countries were involved in the conflict. 
The DRC remains a weak and fragmented state at the very least, with 
different armed factions vying for control over various regions throughout 
the country. In March 1993, Le Monde Diplomatique reported that in the 
country, "the infrastructure, roads, means of communication have 
disappeared, the universities have closed, the hospitals have become 
mortuaries, the campaigns to fight the great epidemics are suspended" 
(Weiss, 1995, p. 158). The current crisis has been ongoing since 1996 and 
attempts at ceasefires have repeatedly been violated. 
In April 2003, President Kabila signed a transitional constitution calling for 
elections and an interim government. Soldiers from neighboring countries 
began to pull out, but violence again erupted in the capital in March 2004 
and in the East in December 2004. Rebel leaders were appointed vice 
presidents and the first elections in the state in over 45 years were held in 
2006. Again, Kabila gained a mandate to serve as President, but peace 
has remained elusive, with violence and renewed fighting breaking out in 
the east of the country in 2008 and displacing hundreds of thousands of 
people. 
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By the beginning of 2009, there were two armed groups operating in 
eastern DRC that had the strongest military capacities, and that had also 
caused the most civilian suffering: the exiled Rwandan Hutus grouped 
together in the Front Democratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), 
and Laurent Nkunda's Tutsi-dominated Congres National du Peuple 
(CNDP). However, Nkunda's ambition would come to alienate the 
supporters he once had in the Rwandan government. When the CNDP 
forced the total collapse of the Congolese army, Kabila cut a deal with 
Kagame, and alliances in the region were about to change. 
On 20 January 2009, the Rwandan army moved through North Kivu as 
part of Operation Umoja Wetu (Our Unity). In exchange for the removal of 
Nkunda by Kigali, Kinshasa agreed to a join military operation against the 
FDLR and, in fact, to give key positions in the political and security 
institutions of the Kivus to members of the CNDP. After 35 days, results of 
Umoja Wetu were modest at best. 
The FDLR had only been marginally weakened in the region, and almost 
completely untouched in South Kivu. Less than 500 FDLR members 
surrendered to the United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC), and no 
less than one month later, the rebels had regrouped and began retaliating 
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against those civilians it believed were a part of Umoja Wetu (International 
Crisis Group, 2009). At the very least, the Operation represented a new 
partnership between Rwandan and Congolese troops that could represent 
an important step forward. 
Umoja Wetu was followed by Kimia II, which launched on 2 March 2009. 
Meaning "calm" in Kiswahili, Kimia II was a joint effort of MONUC and the 
Congolese army to secure civilians while disarming finally the FDLR and 
pushing them away from strategic and mineral-rich areas. According to 
MONUC, 1878 combatants have been demobilized as part of Kimia II, 198 
in October 2009 alone. With pre-2009 estimates of between 5,000 and 
7,000 FDLR members, that would suggest that Kimia II has helped put a 
dent in FDLR forces by up to a quarter (Stearns, 2009). 
Still, Kimia II has been criticized by many organizations for the coinciding 
spike in deliberate killings by the Congolese army (at least 505 civilians 
since the operation began), as well as retaliation killings against civilians 
by the FDLR (at least 630 by September 2009), and MONUC's inability to 
protect civilians has been questioned (Troops killed 500, 2009). Whether 
the abuses are directly related to Kimia II operations is questionable. Still, 
MONUC has since taken a step back in its support of Congolese troops in 
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the worst-affected regions but continues its participation in overall 
operations. 
What is clear is that the two histories of Rwanda and the DRC are 
inevitably intertwined, and fifteen years after the Rwandan genocide and 
the resulting spread of rebels in eastern DRC, they remain a significant 
threat to peace in the region. They have not yet been disarmed and 
continue to pose a threat to civilians in both countries, as well as the 
stability of their governments. 
7. 3 Inside Rwanda Today: A Profile 
The preceding brief account of the histories of conflict in both Rwanda and 
the DRC demonstrate the deep ethnic tensions that run through both 
societies and, in the case of Rwanda, tensions that have run since well 
before the genocide. Post-genocidal Rwanda has seen significant 
economic achievements. In fact, the World Bank's 2006 Global Monitoring 
Report names Rwanda as one of those "[countries making the fastest 
progress [and] exceeding the rates of improvement achieved by today's 
industrialized countries at a similar point in their history" (p. 47). Still, 
Rwanda continues to struggle with a per capita income that is lower today 
than it was in 1990, and more households below the poverty line than 
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there were in 1985 (Government of Rwanda, 2002). And, despite having 
restored peace and stability within its own borders, Rwanda is still feeling 
the threat from the conflict that continues to erupt on the Congolese side 
of its border. 
Rwanda has a population of 8.1 million and a yearly population growth 
rate of 2.9 percent. The average life expectancy at birth is 43 for males 
and 46 for females (UNCTAD, 2005). Despite having the world's highest 
urbanization growth rate with 11.6 percent in 2005, Kigali remains the only 
major city in Rwanda, with a population of one million - 900,000 more than 
any other city in the country (Republic of Rwanda, 2003). The majority of 
Rwandans continue to live in a rural society, with 60 percent of the 
population living below the national poverty line of RwF 64,000 per annum 
per adult and 42 percent below the extreme poverty line of RwF 45,000 
(Republic of Rwanda and UN, 2003). Much of this poverty is concentrated 
in rural areas, more so than in other African countries (Mackinnon et al., 
2003), with the incidence of poverty higher than 50 percent in all provinces 
except the city of Kigali, which stands at 12.3 percent (Government of 
Rwanda, 2002) 
As a result of this growing urban-rural divide, so too is there a growing 
inequality among the population. The average consumption of the top 
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quintile of the population is almost ten times the average consumption in 
the bottom quintile. In addition, Rwanda's Ginicoefficient has increased 
sharply from one of the best figures on the continent in the mid-1980s with 
0.27 to a rather high level in 2001 of 0.4555 (Republic of Rwanda, 2003a). 
The genocide, and subsequent economic and social reforms initiated by 
the Kagame Government, has turned Rwanda into an international favorite 
for foreign assistance. Many donors are particularly active in Rwanda 
particularly because of a desire to support a tragic country where the 
international community previously failed just over a decade ago. 
Immediately following the genocide, Rwanda received up to US$700 
million in foreign aid. In 2004, this figure dropped to US$468 million, but 
this still remains well ahead of many other African countries (World Bank, 
2006). Thirty six percent of this aid was attributed to general budget 
support, while the other funds were used for a variety of purposes: 17 
percent went to economic infrastructure development, 16 percent to 
human resource development, 9 percent to governance measures, 7 
percent to rural development, 5 percent to education, 3 percent to cross-
cutting issues, 2 percent to private sector development, and 5 percent to 
other projects (Amis et al., 2005). 
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In an effort to improve its socio-economic standings, Rwanda has begun 
to increase its participation in multilateral and regional blocs, including the 
African Economic Community (AEC), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), and the East African 
Community (EAC). It is also a founding member of the Economic 
Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). Together, they include 
areas of cooperation as broad as trade, investment, monetary and fiscal 
affairs, infrastructure and services, human resources, science and 
technology, agriculture, environment, tourism and wildlife management, 
and health, social and cultural activities. 
Regional integration agreements have potentially far-reaching impacts on 
Rwanda's refugees. They mean that the Government will have to follow 
rules and legislation that impact on all members of the grouping. It is 
further bound by certain decisions and has to give up on sovereignty and 
decision-making power. These agreements usually involve regional 
initiatives that are much more viable and sustainable than local or national 
ones. The protection of refugees, for example, is much easier if 
comprehensive measures are implemented in all of Rwanda's neighboring 
countries. 
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Today, Kagame's Government speaks of a homogenous people, and 
works to protect a new Constitution that makes illegal discrimination on the 
basis of race, gender, or religion. By emphasizing a single common 
Rwandan identity, the Government has seemingly conquered 
insurmountable odds in reuniting a country that was fractured almost 
irreparably. It has also implemented a uniquely Rwandan brand of 
transitional justice for genocidaires despite challenges given the scale and 
brutality of the genocide, the high degree of public participation, and the 
geographical and economic constraints that force perpetrators and 
survivors to often live side by side. 
In 2002, the government launched Gacaca, a system of 11,000 community 
courts that were committed to holding those responsible for the genocide 
accountable in criminal trials. While national courts and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda prosecute the higher ranking officials and 
the political and military leadership of the genocide, over 800,000 
Rwandans have been accused before the Gacaca - one-fifth of the 
country's adult population. Despite providing limited reparations to 
survivors, Gacaca courts have been able to offer some degree of symbolic 
reparations, not least of which by requiring suspects who plead guilty to 
reveal the whereabouts of their victims' remains in order to be eligible for 
reduced sentencing. 
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Still, there are those who criticize the government's supposed elimination 
of ethnic distinctions as self-serving for Kagame in that it works to disguise 
the dangerously overwhelming majority of Tutsis in government and the 
underrepresentation of Hutus (Adams, 2008). So, too, could this reflect the 
heavy hand of Kagame himself, whose picture hangs in houses, 
restaurants, and shops across the country. 
Whatever the motive, in underscoring the unifying attributes of Rwandans, 
outsiders are necessarily labeled as such. Rwanda's refugees must 
therefore cope with not only regaining their economic footing in a new 
country that is itself on unsure footing, but surviving the fractured social 
fabric in which they now find themselves. It is the purpose of this thesis to 
discover to what extent this has affected levels of integration among a 
select group of urban refugees. 
7.4 The Refugee Context 
One of the reasons for selecting Rwanda as the location for this study was 
precisely because of the fact that it is rarely thought of in terms of a 
refugee-hosting country. On the contrary, thanks to the tragic legacy of the 
1994 genocide, Rwanda is rightly regarded as one of East Africa's largest 
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refugee-producing countries. Indeed, thousands of Rwandan refugees still 
make neighboring countries including Uganda and Tanzania their home. 
Despite the signing of tripartite agreements with these countries for the 
voluntary repatriation of refugees, many still choose not to return based on 
fears of oppression from the government (Williams, 2004). 
Still, thousands of refugees from the DRC, Burundi, and a host of other 
countries, are being sheltered in camps and living in urban areas 
throughout Rwanda. This study aims to shed light on these refugees who, 
largely in the aftermath of 1994, have been steadily streaming into 
Rwanda and trying to eke out a living for themselves. 
7.41 Dimensions 
According to the latest UNHCR estimates, Rwanda is home to 55,645 
refugees, of which 52,083 originate from the DRC (93.5 percent) and 
2,831 originate from Burundi (5 percent).The remaining 1.5 percent of 
refugees come primarily from Kenya and Somalia. The majority of these 
refugees are female, numbering 30,635 (55 percent). Children are the 
other major component: 12,233 (20.85 percent) are between the ages of 0 
and 4, 2,914 (23.24 percent) are between the ages of 5 and 11, and 
10,044 (18.34 percent) are between 12 and 17 years old (Mutesi, 2008). 
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These 55,645 refugees are housed in six refugee camps spread 
throughout the country: Nyabiheke, Kiziba, Nkamira, Nyagatare, Gihembe, 
and Kiziba. Both Kiziba camp in the west and Gihembe camp in the north 
host more than 18,000 refugees each. 
The majority of Burundian refugees fled to Rwanda in 2005 due to fighting 
between the Burundian army and the National Liberation Front, and they 
now live in Kigeme camp. Meanwhile, the majority of Rwanda's Congolese 
refugees fled various waves of fighting in the 1900s and again between 
2000 and 2003. In late 2006, renewed fighting in North and South Kivu 
Provinces in eastern DRC prompted another influx of refugees to Rwanda. 
At the time of writing, conflict has again flared up in the eastern DRC (see 
Ch. 7.2). As a result, the western city of Gisenyi in Rwanda, a ten-minute 
walk across the border from Goma, has once again been overwhelmed 
with Congolese refugees. It is estimated that some 250,000 Congolese 
have been displaced due to the recent violence (Nthengwe, 2008). 
In addition to the officially-registered refugees, Rwanda is host to 
approximately 703 asylum seekers, 574 of whom originate from the DRC, 
119 from Burundi, and ten from other countries (Mutesi, 2008). For the 
purposes of this thesis, it is the 2,547 refugees who live in Rwanda's 
urban areas that are the focus of the research. 
92 
According to the UNHCR, 2,547 refugees have been officially registered 
and granted permission to live in urban areas. Of these, 1756 originate 
from the DRC, 763 from Burundi, and 28 from other countries. However, it 
can be reasonably presumed that the number of refugees living in urban 
areas is in fact much higher. In this study conducted, 50 percent of 
participants considered themselves urban refugees because they lived 
and worked in Kigali despite the fact that they were not officially registered 
as such with the UNHCR. Indeed, they did not have the legal right to be 
living in Kigali and according to official records these 50 percent were still 
contained in the refugee camps. Thus, the number of urban refugees, 
including those not officially registered as such, is significantly higher than 
official UNHCR estimates. 
Most of these urban refugees live in Kigali, Rwanda's fast-developing 
capital. Others are more sparsely dispersed in cities including Butare, 
Rwanda's intellectual capital to the west, and Ruhengeri, the most-oft 
used starting point by tourists for Rwanda's famous gorilla trek. 
7.42 Response and protection 
7.421 Government of Rwanda 
93 
According to articles 14, 18 and 41 of Rwanda's Constitution of 2003, the 
Government assumes responsibilities for social security matters. These 
should comprise a number of interventions that guarantee support to the 
most vulnerable members of society. In order to achieve this, various 
ministries and agencies have initiated a number of programs that tackle 
some of the most serious problems. In fact, an estimated seven to ten 
percent of the national budget is allocated to social protection programs 
(MINECOFIN, 2006). 
Despite the multitude of individual initiatives and programs that, together, 
provide a more or less effective public social safety net, observers have 
noted that a coherent strategy for social protection and support particularly 
to the most vulnerable does not yet exist. Challenges include the lack of 
clearly defined programmatic goals, the poor identification of vulnerable 
target groups, including refugees, and the lack of transparency with 
regards to financial sources and partnerships (Bangwanubusa, 2004). Still, 
it is a first important step that the Government has started to recognize 
that this omission constitutes a significant gap in both poverty and growth 
policy. 
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Rwanda is a signatory to both the 1951 United Nations Convention and 
1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees (see Chapter 2.1). It also 
ratified the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the 
Refugee Problem in Africa. Rwanda did initially maintain a reservation to 
the 1951 Convention, which related to refugees' freedom of movement, as 
well as to the 1967 Protocol's offer of recourse to the International 
Criminal Court. However, in March 2008, all reservations were lifted. 
In 2001, the Government of Rwanda passed its own Refugee Law (n° 
34/2001), which took a significant step forward in ensuring the country's 
refugees the rights they were guaranteed under international law. It was 
later modified and complimented by Law n° 29/2006. Law n° 34/2001 
reads: "Considerant que le Rwanda a ratifie ces instruments 
internationaux et qu'il a consequemment reconnu que les problemes des 
refugies doivent etre abordes d'une maniere humanitaire pour leur trouver 
une solution" (p. 1). Its successor goes on to make two important 
adoptions. First, it approves the creation of a National Council for 
Refugees (CNR), made up of representatives from several key 
government ministries, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Justice, and Ministry of Defense. As stated in the Law, "The Council 
follows up and examines issues of foreign refugees who seek asylum in 
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Rwanda and Rwandan refugees in Diaspora and thereafter takes 
decisions" (Art.1). 
TABLE 5: RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NATIONAL REFUGEE COUNCIL OF 
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As outlined in Article 5 of Law n° 29/2006 
To implement the policy governing refugees in general; 
To monitor how the rights of refugees living in Rwanda and those of Rwandan 
returnees are respected in Rwanda; 
To examine and make decisions on applications of persons seeking refugee status 
in Rwanda; 
To retract refugee status from any refugee that does not respect laws on refugees 
in Rwanda; 
To mobilize all necessary resources in order for the achievement of repatriation and 
reintegration activities of Rwandan refugees in Rwanda; 
To establish and follow up good working relationship between Rwanda, UNHCR, 
and Countries in which Rwandans sought asylum so that their repatriation is 
effected without hindrance; 
To examine and approve activity report relating to refugees and returnees prepared 
by the Executive Secretary; 
To draft a financial budget relating to refugees living in Rwanda and the Rwandan 
returnees; 
To submit an activity report to the Minister in charge of refuges and returnees; 
To assist the Government in coordinating the activities of Local Associations and 
International Organizations operating in Rwanda which mobilize funds to assist in 
repatriation and reintegration of refugees. 
The CNR was put in charge of making policy decisions concerning 
refugees, granting and revoking refugee status, ensuring respect for 
refugees' rights, and broadly, implementing the national refugee policy 
instituted in Law n° 34/2001 (see Table 5). The body meets at least three 
times per year. 
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The status determination process for asylum seeks in Rwanda is clearly 
spelled out in Law n° 34/2001. Within 15 days of arriving in Rwanda, all 
asylum seekers have to report to the provincial or municipal authority 
closest to their point of entry and register with the closest immigration 
office. The immigration office then forwards their file to the CNR within 15 
days, which then has six months to decide on the claim. Applicants are 
assessed against a series of criteria largely taken from the 1951 
Convention (see Table 6). After the CNR issues its written decision, the 
applicant has 15 days in which to appeal. The CNR must rule on that 
appeal within 60 days, during which time the applicant is allowed to remain 
in Rwanda. Those granted asylum also have the right to bring their 
spouses and minor children to join them. 
National authorities are responsible for managing the country's transit 
centers and refugee camps. Immigration officials from the Ministry of Local 
Governance, Good Governance, Community Development and Social 
Affairs (MINALOC) register refugees in every refugee camp and transit 
centre. Asylum seekers in transit centers are recognized on a prima facie 
basis. In 2007, the CNR accorded individual refugee status to 160 people, 
all of whom were Congolese. Fifty applications were denied, thirty of which 
were Congolese and twenty Burundian (USCRI, 2008). 
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As outlined in Article 1 of Law n° 34/2001 
• Toute personne qui craignant d'etre persecutee du fait de sa race, de sa 
religion, de sa nationalite, de son appartenance a un group sociale, de son 
origine ethnique ou tribale, ou de ses opinions divergeant avec la politique 
nationale du pays dont elle a la nationalite, quitte ce pays, et qui, du fait de cette 
crainte, ne peut ou ne veut se reclamer de la protection de ce pays; 
• Toute personne qui, n'ayant plus de nationalite et se trouvent hors du pays 
dans lequel elle avait sa residence habituelle, a une crainte bien fondee d'etre 
persecute pour des raisons de race, d'origine ethnique ou tribale, de religion, de 
nationalite, d'appartenance a un groupe social ou d'opinions divergeant avec la 
politique nationale, ne peut ou ne veut, en raison de ladite crainte, y retourner; 
• Toute personne qui, du fait d'une agression, d'une occupation exterieure, d'une 
domination etrangere ou d'evenements troublant gravement I'ordre public dans 
une partie ou dans la totalite de son pays d'origine ou du pays dont elle a la 
nationalite, quitte sa residence habituelle pour chercher refuge dans un autre 
endroit a I'exterieur de son pays d'origine ou du pays dont elle a la nationalite. 
From its inception, however, the CNR has struggled with issues of 
capacity (USCRI, 2008). Although created in 2001, the CNR did not 
actually begin to register applicants and conduct status determination until 
2004. During the three-year lag, the UNHCR took responsibility for 
adjudicating new applications and counseling new applicants. It was not 
until 2006 that the CNR was able to assume full responsibility for the 
application procedures. Even then, insufficient staffing (one executive 
secretary, three officers in charge of status determination, one officer in 
charge of repatriation, one accountant, and one secretary) continued to 
hamper the CNR's ability to carry out its mandate. Lack of expertise on 
refugee law and international protection on the part of the CNR has also 
made the system in Rwanda slow and inefficient. 
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In addition to the CNR, the national Refugee Law also put into a place a 
list of both the rights that officially recognized refugees are entitled to, as 
well as the duties that came along with being recognized as such (see 
Table 7). 
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As outlined in Article 22 of Law n° 34/2001 
Le droit a un traitement non discriminatoire; 
La liberie de religion reconnue par les lois regissant les associations sans 
but lucrative au Rwanda; 
Le droit a la propriete mobiliere et immobiliere; 
Le droit a la propriete intellectuelle et industrielle; 
Le droit d'associations a caractere non politique; 
Le droit d'ester et d'etre represente en justice; 
Le droit a un emploi; 
Le droit au logement; 
Le droit a I'assistance et a la protection de I'Administration; 
La liberie de circulation conformement a la loi. 
Among others, refugees are guaranteed the right to work, to housing, and 
to protection from the Government. Reflecting back on Banki's factors for 
successful integration, many of the necessary ingredients are seemingly 
present in Rwanda. This will be returned to in further discussions (see Ch. 
8.1). 
7.422 United Nations 
TABLE 7: RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF REFUGEES IN RWAND, 
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UNHCR in Rwanda is composed of four offices spread out across the 
country, and maintained by 30 national and 18 international staff 
members. With a 2009 budget of US$5,271,838 (see Table 8), UNHCR 
Rwanda has four main objectives in the current year: (i) Protect and assist 
refugees from the DRC and Burundi and asylum seekers from other 
countries; (ii) Improve shelter, water supplies, sanitation and educational 
facilities in three camps hosting a total of 50,000 DRC refugees; (iii) Help 
the Government promote the voluntary repatriation of Rwanda refugees 
and create income-generating activities for them; and (iv) Strengthen the 
national authorities' Refugee Status Determination capacity. Select key 
targets for 2009 include: (i) 50,000 refugees and asylum seekers receive 
international protection and material assistance; (ii) 10,000 Rwandan 
refugees repatriate voluntarily in safety and dignity, receiving an improved 
returnee package and transportation to their communities of origin; (ii) 
2,000 Burundian refugees repatriate voluntarily by the end of 2008, and 
Kigeme refugee camp is closed; (iii) 500 refugees repatriate voluntarily to 
DRC, security permitting; and (iv) Full enrolment in primary school for all 
refugee children is maintained, and girls' secondary school enrolment is 
increased to 100 percent (UNHCR, 2008). 
UNHCR Rwanda has also highlighted three goals as they specifically 
relate to urban refugees, namely: (i) To strengthen the information 
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provided to urban refugees; (ii) To implement self-reliance activities; (iii) 
To limit and reduce the care and assistance provided. As their Country 
Operations Plan for 2007 states: 
It is expected that urban refugees will have more 
access to self reliance activities in order to create 
and increase their incomes and this way, ensure 
their subsistence...There is a great need to 
advocate for more support from all stakeholders to 
self help activities to benefit urban refugees, as 
this is key to the success of the strategy and the 
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Source: (UNHCR, 2007) 
In 2007, UNHCR protected and assisted a total of 51,600 refugees and 
asylum-seekers across Rwanda's refugee camps and transit centers, as 
well as 2,600 urban refugees in Kigali. Its assistance focused on ten 
priority areas: community services, domestic needs and household 
support, education, health and nutrition, legal assistance, operational 
support, sanitation, shelter and infrastructure, transport and logistics, and 
water. Key activities undertaken by UNHCR Rwanda in 2008 can be found 
in Table 8. 
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Key activities and assistance undertaken in 2008 
Community Services 
• Conducted country-wide age, 
gender and diversity 
assessments 
• Created strategy for reduction 
of sexual and gender-based 
violence in all camps 
• Monitored implementation of 
standard operational 
procedures 
• Supported refugee camp 
management committees 
• Organized awareness 
campaigns and trainings on 
sexual and gender-based 
violence and HIV/AIDS 
Lej[al 
• Updated registration data on 
camp-based refugees 
• Working with CNR to develop 
systematic information system 
Operational SuDDort 
• Provided technical and financial 
support to CNR 
• Organized training sessions for 
CNR and implementing 
partners 
Sanitation 
• Oversaw community program 
requiring household members 
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Domestic Needs / Household 
SuDDOrt 
• Distributed essential non-food 
items and firewood in all 
camps and transit centers 
• Distributed sanitary materials 
to all camp-based refugee 
women and girls 
Education 
• Oversaw schooling of 11,600 
primary school-aged camp-
based refugees 
• Assisted 590 urban refugee 
children in Kigali with primary 
schooling 
Health / Nutrition 
• Provided basic health care to 
camp-based and urban 
refugees in Kigali 
• Provided counseling HIV/AIDS 
counseling and testing to 7,300 
camp-based refugees 
• Provided anti-retroviral 
treatment to 260 refugees 
to clean latrines twice a day 
Shelter / Infrastructure 
• Rehabilitated 1,800 houses and 
helped construct 320 shelters 
and 1,000 new houses 
• Maintained 6 kilometers of road 
to the camps 
• Refurbished a market in 
Gihembe 
• Equipped 200 communal 
kitchens with improved stoves 
Transport / Loqistics 
• Used public transport to avoid 
any disruption in delivery of 
supplies to camps and transfer 
new refugees from transit 
centers to Nyabiheke 
Water 
• Provided 15 liters per refugee 
per day in camps 
Source: (UNHCR, 2007) 
7.423 Non-Governmental Organizations 
UNHCR works with the following NGOs as implementing partners in 
Rwanda: Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA), American Refugee Committee 
(ARC), Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), Save the Children UK, and Forum 
for African Women Educationists. During this study, respondents noted 
receiving various support from AHA, JRS, and Right to Play. Thus, for the 
purpose of this thesis, it is these three organizations that will be examined 
in further detail. 
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AHA is a pan-African NGO that works to provide effective humanitarian 
assistance to alleviate human suffering, building on the strength of African 
people to solve African problems. Founded in 1994 in response to the 
Rwandan genocide, it has since supported more than 10 million people in 
16 African countries, to regain their health, dignity and wellbeing. Today, 
AHA has 1,700 staff throughout Africa, working in partnership with local 
populations to address the following six priority areas: (i) Capacity 
development; (ii) Health care; (iii) HIV/AIDS prevention and care; (iv) 
Public advocacy; (v) Relief and recovery; and (vi) Sexual and gender-
based violence prevention and response. 
A large portion of AHA's work is concerned with health care, where in 
Rwanda it provides medical services in Kibiza Camp. It also provides 
feeding centers, education and awareness programs, capacity 
development services. At the end of 2006, however, AHA introduced a 
new Urban Refugee Program, which seeks to address the health care 
needs of refugees in Kigali. In its first year, this program saw the opening 
of a Consultation Clinic in Kigali. Since then, it has expanded its program 
to include prevention, care, treatment and capacity development to urban 
refugees. In 2008, AHA reports to have provided over 5,100 urban 
refugees with access to health care and nutritional support, as well as 
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supporting more than 1,000 young people in accessing education -
providing school materials, uniforms and tuition fees (AHA, 2008). AHA 
has identified numerous challenges it faces with working in Rwanda, 
namely a high turnaround of local staff and budget constraints. 
Still, in 2007, with a budget of US$579,533, AHA reports to have assisted 
more than 18,000 Congolese refugees, 3,000 urban refugees, as well as 
3,000 local Rwandans. 
JRS is an international Catholic organization at work in more than 50 
countries, providing assistance to refugees in refugee camps, to people 
displaced within their own country, to asylum seekers in cities, and those 
held in detention. Set up by the Society of Jesus in 1980, JRS is a 
worldwide network of associates and institutions of this Catholic religious 
order. Today, JRS is comprised of over 1,400 workers, the majority of 
whom work on a voluntary basis. They serve refugees, offering them 
practical and spiritual support, according to their humanitarian needs. 
JRS focuses its services in the fields of education, emergency assistance, 
health and nutrition, income generating activities and social services. It is 
also very much concerned with advocacy and human rights work. This 
involves ensuring that refugees are afforded their full rights while in exile 
and during repatriation as guaranteed by the 1951 Convention and 
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working to strengthen the protection afforded to IDPs. This extends to 
lobbying for and promoting greater international protection and human 
rights legislation, either through participation in international campaigns 
and coalitions or through membership of international forums such as the 
UN Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC). 
In Rwanda, JRS serves as the implementing partner for UNHCR for 
education in both Kiziba and Gihembe camps, where it offered pre-school, 
primary and three years of secondary education to 1,242, 8,358, and 
1,734 respectively to refugee children in 2006. It also sponsored 439 
refugee children to finish their secondary education in schools outside the 
camps. JRS also provided 401 refugees with skills training in various 
trades in both camps, as well as literacy classes to 459 students, and 
cultural, sports, and religious activities to 7,300 refugees (JRS, 2007). 
Right to Play is an international humanitarian organization that uses sport 
and play programs to improve health, develop life skills, and foster peace 
for children and communities in some of the most disadvantaged areas of 
the world. Right To Play trains local community leaders as coaches to 
deliver its programs in countries affected by war, poverty, and disease in 
Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and South America. Currently active in 23 
countries, its programs target the most marginalized, including girls, 
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people living with disability, children affected by HIV and AIDS, street 
children, former child combatants and refugees. 
Right To Play began operating in Rwanda in 2003. There, its Play to Learn 
project has grown from a volunteer-run operation based solely in Kigali, to 
a country-based office with a local staff of 20. In October of 2007, Right To 
Play launched an expansion of activities into Rubavu district. Moving away 
from working just in Kigali and its surrounding areas, the opening of a 
second office in the town of Gisenyi marked not only the extension of 
Right To Play activities to new areas in the country, but also a trend in 
positive collaboration with local authorities in Rwanda. By the end of 2008, 
Right to Play had trained 1,041 leaders from the community, and reached 
out to 50,141 children (RTP, 2009). 
7.5 Data Presentation 
This section attempts a presentation and analysis of data collected from 
twenty urban refugees in Kigali. The section is divided into three sub-
sections: (i) an analysis of the socio-demographic characteristics of 
respondents; (ii) an analysis of the conditions of respondents' lives before 
their arrival in Kigali; and (iii) an analysis of the conditions of respondents' 
lives after their arrival in Kigali. In the final sub-section, an analysis of the 
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roles of the agencies, organizations, and networks in supporting the 
respondents will also be brought in. 
7.51 Social Demographic Characteristics 
This sub-section presents the data results of respondents as they relate to 
age, educational background, and household composition. 
7.511 Age Distribution 
TABLE 9: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS 
Age Group 
1 5 - 1 9 
2 0 - 2 4 






















2 5 - 2 9 
A 3 0 - 34 
3 5 - 3 9 
































is an important variable in this study as it influences the respondents' 
ability to engage in productive activity. As noted by Johnson and Neumark 
(1997), in the life cycle hypothesis of human capital theory, there is a 
relationship between productivity and age, with productive age normally 
considered to be between the ages of 15 and 49. Although this study does 
not directly test this hypothesis, it shows that age is an important variable 
since in that it influences respondents' ability to partake in productive 
activity. 
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In Rwanda, the median age of the population is 18.7 years. With 42.1 
percent under the age of 14, and 55.4 percent between the ages of 15 and 
64, there is only a very small 2.4 percent of the population above 65 years. 
The age distribution of the respondents in this study can be found in Table 
9. 
Of the total 20 participants who were interviewed, 30 percent (6) fell within 
the ages of 20 and 24. This was followed by 20 percent (4) within the ages 
30 and 34, 15 percent (3) from each of the ages of 15 and 19, and 35 and 
39 respectively. Finally, ten percent of respondents (2) fell within the 25 to 
29 age group, as well as the 40 to 44 age group. Of those respondents 
officially registered as urban refugees, the majority fell within the 20 to 24 
and the 35 to 39 age groups. Of those respondents not officially registered 
in Kigali, the majority fell within the 20 to 24 and 30 to 34 age groups. 
It is clear from Table 9 that the majority of respondents for this study were 
under the age of 35, with all of them falling within Johnson and Neumark's 
productive age range. As indicated earlier, this is partially due to the 
method of selection, as respondents were largely from the same circle of 
friends and thus more likely to be of similar ages. However, as Fall (1998) 
observes, the mobility of migrants declines at the age of 34 years. With 75 
percent (15) of respondents in this study under the age of 35, Fall's 
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findings would certainly seem to hold true. It is also important to note that 
90 percent of those refugees not officially registered in Kigali are below the 
age of 35, versus only 60 percent of the legal urban refugees. This would 
seem to indicate that a refugee's willingness to take the risk of leaving a 
camp without official permission and move to the city to try and make a 
living decreases with age. 
7.512 Educational Background 
Rwanda committed itself to achieving universal primary education by 2010 
and nine years of basic education for all by 2015, and indeed, looks to be 
on track towards meeting both of those goals (Republic of Rwanda, 
2003b). In the years since the genocide, the Government has made 
significant strides in this sector, with primary level enrollment rates 
reaching 92 percent in 2006, one of the highest in the region 
(MINECOFIN, 2006). This is thanks to the introduction of policies that 
abolished primary school fees and compulsory school uniforms, and 
distributed freely textbooks to schools (Republic of Rwanda, 2004a). 
Secondary level enrolments have also improved steadily from a regional 
low of 6.5 percent in 2001 to 9.1 percent in 2005, which has also 
translated into increased enrolment in Rwanda's six universities from 
16,000 in 2002 to 25,000 in 2004 (Republic of Rwanda, 2006). 
I l l 
Still, universal access to education remains hindered by levies at certain 
schools, social pressure to wear uniforms, distance to schools, and the 
opportunity cost that a household suffers by sending the children to school 
(Obura, 2005). For instance, according to World Bank estimates, 33.1 
percent of Rwandan children between the ages of 7 and 14 are 
economically active (World Bank, 2006a). 
In following, according to the 2005 Citizen Report Card, 42 percent of 
parents felt that despite the removal of most fees, the opportunity costs of 
sending their children to primary school remained too high. As of April 
2009, 24 percent of women and 17 percent of men in Rwanda's rural 
areas have no formal education. In urban areas, the percentages drop 
slightly to 13 and 9 percent respectively (MOH, 2009). 
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It is within this context that urban refugees in Rwanda also struggle to earn 
an education and create opportunity for themselves. As livelihood options 
are increased by investment in education and by the skills that people 
acquire, it is important for this study to ascertain the education levels of 
respondents. Table 10 indicates the various educational backgrounds 
respondents attained in their countries of origin prior to their arrival in 
Kigali. 
Table 10 illustrates that prior to fleeing their country of origin, educational 
access and qualifications of respondents were varied. The majority of 
respondents (12) had begun or completed secondary or university 
education, while 20 percent (4) had completed primary school and another 
15 percent (3) had received vocational training. Five percent of 
respondents (1) were illiterate (having no formal education). Those 
respondents officially considered urban refugees were shown to have the 
same amount of secondary education as those illegal urban refugees. 
And, while those illegal urban refugees had 50 percent more vocational 
training and 33.3 percent greater levels of primary level education, those 
legal urban refugees in Kigali possessed 50 percent higher levels of 
university level education. 
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The interviews found that the six respondents who had tertiary education 
had studied a wide range of topics, including Accounting, Banking, 
Commerce, Management, and Political Science. Still, one 29 year old 
male noted that, "I couldn't finish because we didn't have the financial 
means" (personal communication, 2 October 2008). Respondents who 
indicated having vocational training all noted that it was in the field of 
automobiles and mechanics. Meanwhile, all of the respondents who 
indicated having no formal education prior to becoming refugees noted 
that it was because they were too young at the time to start school. 
In total, 80 percent of respondents had some level of formal education 
prior to arriving in Kigali. While those with university level education were 
twice as likely to be recognized as official urban refugees, it was those 
with greater vocational skills that took the risk to move to the city without 
official permission in the hopes of putting those skills to work. 








































Upon their arrival in Rwanda, several respondents continued to pursue 
educational opportunities. Twenty-five percent of respondents (5) were, at 
the time of questioning enrolled in university in Kigali, 60 percent (3) of 
who are officially registered urban refugees (see Table 11). Meanwhile, 20 
percent (4) indicated they are currently enrolled in secondary school, 5 
percent (1) of whom are officially registered urban refugees. An additional 
10 percent of respondents (2) noted that while they are no longer pursuing 
their own education, their children are currently enrolled in primary or 
secondary school in Kigali. Both of these respondents are officially 
registered urban refugees. Thus, with 45 percent of respondents currently 
enrolled in school in Kigali, it can be seen that, whether officially 
recognized as such or not, they have been both eager to, and able to 
access educational opportunities. 
Of those legal urban refugees who are currently pursuing education in 
Kigali, 100 percent (4) indicated that they do so with the financial support 
of UNHCR. On the other hand, only 5 percent (1) of those illegal urban 
refugees indicated they are receiving financial support to do so from JRS. 
Five percent (1) noted they pay for secondary school with money sent 
from family members living abroad, and a further 15 percent (3) pay their 
school fees from their own salaries or with the support of roommates. One 
26-year old male who is illegally living in Kigali but working in a financial 
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institution noted, "It is very difficult, but I pay for school with the little 
money I make from my job" (personal communication, 22 August 2008). 
The respondents with children attending school in Kigali all indicated they 
receive financial support to do so from UNHCR. 
Interestingly, this is the sole case throughout this study where a participant 
identified making use of remittances. To contrast this with their local 
Rwandan counterparts, Clay and vander Haar (1993) found that 60 
percent of households in Rwanda received some form of support from 
family members living outside the household, primarily through 
intergenerational support, or from children to parents. It would thus seem 
that the family support networks of these urban refugees are significantly 
weaker than their local counterparts. Still, with little support in the form of 
remittances, and equally little support from official or non-governmental 
channels, they have proven resilient in their desire, and their ability to find 
their own means to take advantage of educational opportunities. 
7.513 Household Composition 
The household is organized around needs that have social, psychological, 
cultural, and historical dimensions to them. Rakodi (2002) has argued that 
household size or composition is a determining factor of the capacities and 
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strategies available to it. Gonzalez de la Rocha (2000) has also stated that 
the size of a household and the availability of earners are very important 
elements of its vulnerability. Thus, poverty is more likely in a large 
household with proportionally small income earners. 
Household size of respondents ranged from two to nine with an average of 
4.5 members. The age of dependents in these households ranged from 
five months to 50 years. Forty percent of respondents (8) live in male-only 
households, while 5 percent (1) live in female-only households (see Table 
12). The remaining 55 percent of respondents (11) live in mixed gender 
households, with 36 percent of these (4) in households that contained only 
family members. Interestingly, with only one respondent living in a female-
only household, it would seem as though female refugees are far less 
likely to make the move to an urban area when unaccompanied by a male, 
TABLE 12: HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION OF REPSONDENTS IN 
RWANDA 
Housemates 
Live with fellow refugees 
Live with local Rwandans 













































































whether or not they are given official permission to do so. 
In 30 percent of the cases, respondents considered themselves heads of 
the household, with the additional responsibility of caring for roommates 
and/or family members. Interestingly, all of the respondents who indicated 
they are currently living with family were also considered officially urban, 
thus indicating a negative correlation between having dependents and the 
willingness to take the risk of leaving camps for urban areas without official 
permission. 
At 70 percent (14), the majority of respondents also live in households 
comprised of only fellow refugees (see Table 12). Meanwhile, 20 percent 
(4) of respondents live in mixed households of both fellow refugees and 
local Rwandans, and 10 percent of respondents (2) live in households with 
only local Rwandans. Interestingly, 100 percent (10) of those respondents 
considered official urban refugees lived in households with only fellow 
refugees, half of which live with their families. On the other hand, 60 
percent (6) of respondents considered unofficial urban refugees lived in 
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these mixed or local households. This would seem to indicate that, armed 
with smaller support networks as individuals, the illegal urban refugees 
adapted by developing new and stronger networks within their new 
communities. 
100 percent of respondents (20) reported to be tenants in their houses, 
paying a monthly rental fee to the property owner. These fees ranged from 
0 RwF (where their roommates took care of all payments) to 100,000 
RwF, with the average being 25,000 RwF. One respondent noted, "20,000 
RwF gets you a small bedroom and living room. It depends on the 
standard of house you can live in" (personal communication, 31 July 
2008). Given the average number of residents per household, it can be 
assumed that most households have two or more persons sharing a 
bedroom. Here, the findings of Gonzalez de la Rocha (2000) prove true, 
as respondents with greater numbers of roommates had smaller financial 
burdens when it came to paying rent. 
7.52 Life Before Arrival in Rwanda 
Although this study is not directly concerned with the dynamics of the 
economic life of respondents while in their country of origin, it is necessary 
to examine the issue to some degree in order to better understand not 
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only the 'shock' of the conflict and their suddenly becoming refugees, but 
more importantly to assess the skills and experience they may have 
brought with them to their new lives as refugees. 
All of respondents originated from the DRC. This is due both to the 
method of selection (see Ch.6), and to the fact that more than two-thirds of 
Rwanda's refuges originate from the DRC. Prior to fleeing their home 
countries, 40 percent of respondents (8) indicated that they held jobs that 
were sufficient in supporting themselves and their families where the case 
may be. These jobs included: an administrative clerk for a local NGO, a 
chauffeur, farmers, a musician, and small business owners. One 
respondent noted, "We ran a small business in town. The conclusion? 
Everything was great" (personal communication, 8 August 2008). 
A further 45 percent of respondents (9) indicated that members of their 
family, including husbands and parents, held jobs that supported them, 
and thus were not looking for jobs. For instance, one respondent said, "My 
father was a state official and we had a salary at the end of each month. It 
was enough to take care of all of us" (personal communication, 9 
September 2008). Another noted, "I was too young, but my parents 
worked as farmers. We struggled, but we worked" (personal 
communication, 15 August 2008). The remaining 15 percent of 
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respondents (3) said they did not hold regular jobs before fleeing their 
home country (see Table 13). 
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Interestingly, of the 40 percent of respondents (8) that held permanent, 
full-time employment in the DRC, 37.5 (3) would go on to gain official 
urban refugee status in Kigali, while the remaining 62.5 percent (5) would 
go on to live in Kigali without official urban refugee status. Here, the nature 
of the employment was likely a determining factor since the official urban 
refugees were more likely to be employed in the formal sector, while all of 
those not recognized as urban were employed in the informal sector. Still, 
at a price of RwF 200,000 each, buying a work permit that would allow 
them to work legally in the country, proved too expensive for even many 
legal urban refugees. 
However, with only 15 percent of respondents unemployed in their country 
of origin, the remaining 85 percent were necessarily armed with skills and 
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experience when they fled to Rwanda. In particular, many of the skills they 
came bearing were in high demand in Kigali. For instance, with one of the 
highest pupil-to-teacher ratios in the region at 69 to 1, Rwanda suffers 
from inadequate and insufficient availability of teaching and learning 
materials (Republic of Rwanda, 2006f: 6). Thus, the 40 year old male who 
studied Political Science at university in the DRC and became a high 
school teacher in Kigali was contributing his skills to fill a tremendous 
need. 
7.53 Life After Arrival in Rwanda 
Respondents arrived in Rwanda between the years of 1996 and 2004, 
with the majority of 60 percent (12) having arrived between 1996 and 1998 
(see Table 14). Thus, 75 percent of respondents have lived in Rwanda for 
nearly ten years. Interestingly, of the five respondents who arrived most 
recently between 2002 and 2005, three are gainfully employed and two 
are enrolled in school. This would seem to indicate little correlation 
between their time of arrival and their ability to find work or education 
opportunities. The remainder of this sub-section describes their various 




































7.531 Conditions of Arrival 
On arrival in Rwanda, 75 percent of respondents (15) reported first 
spending time in refugee camps before making their way to Kigali. The 
remaining 25 percent of respondents (5) arrived directly from the DRC to 
Kigali without first passing through a refugee camp. The length of stay in 
refugee camps ranged from four months to ten years, with the average 
length of stay being four years and four months. Fifty percent (50) of 
respondents classified as official urban refugees first spent time in refugee 
camps before moving to Kigali, as did 100 percent (10) of those 
respondents considered nonofficial (see Table 15). 
TABLE 15: RESPONDENTS' LENGTH OF TIME SPENT IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN 
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Interestingly, those who spent more than 5 years in camps are all between 
19 and 24 years old and were all enrolled in school in the DRC before 
fleeing. Meanwhile, those respondents who passed no time in a refugee 
camp before moving to Kigali were all above the age of 30, a potential sign 
of the skills and experience they were thought to have that would help 
facilitate their integration into an urban area. Furthermore, 75 percent of 
respondents (15) noted that they still have members of their immediate or 
extended family living in refugee camps on Rwanda's border with DRC. 
The length of time spent in a refugee camp prior to arriving in Kigali was 
found to have little impact on respondents' ability to find work or enroll in 
school (see Ch. 7.33). However, it does point to the severity of the refugee 
crisis in Rwanda, and the camps as much more than a supposedly 
temporary fix to a supposedly temporary problem. 
While not the direct focus of this thesis, it is also important to examine the 
living conditions of respondents in the camps, as they are illuminating of 
their reasons to seek life in urban areas instead. One respondent noted, 
"Everything there is bad, but the worst is the malnutrition and where we 
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had to sleep" (personal communication, 22 August 2008). Another agreed, 
saying, "Some days I didn't have anything to eat. My family had to 
compromise and everyone depends on UNHCR. There is no choice" 
(personal communication, 31 July 2008). When asked to highlight their 
biggest challenge of living in camps, one respondent said, "Housing and 
the means of survival are really terrible" (personal communication, 24 
October 2008). Another said, "For me, the total dependence was the worst 
thing about life in the camps. We used to take care of ourselves. Here, we 
are beggars" (personal communication, 2 October 2008). Yet another 
respondent said, "While refugees live in camps, there are things you are 
deprived of: a life, a job. There are lots of diseases. We study but it's 
difficult" (personal communication, 15 August 2008). 
Several respondents noted that despite the negative conditions of life in 
the camps, it also had its benefits, including security, health care, and 
support for education. For instance, one respondent noted, "The best thing 
about life in the camp was the security because there is never anyone 
behind me like those who are now in prison, those who mistreated us" 
(personal communication, 31 July 2008). Another said, "In those three 
years [that I was in the camp], I couldn't hear loud gun shots anymore. I 
couldn't hear shouting, or raping, or killing" (personal communication, 2 
October 2008). Others still expressed their gratitude for the various 
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support services they received while in the camps. "The best thing is the 
medical care and schooling. We had a good relationship between 
refugees and UNHCR" (personal communication, 8 August 2008). 
In order to make a living and pass the time in refugee camps, respondents 
noted they were wholly dependent on the support they received from 
UNHCR, the World Food Program, and a few NGOs (although several 
pointed out that even this was insufficient). "We did nothing in the way of 
activities or generating revenue which could have helped make a living. 
We survived thanks to the humanitarian aid from UNHCR and WFP," one 
respondent said (personal communication, 22 August 2008). "We were 
dependent for everything and never had enough of anything. I mean food, 
soap, clothes, everything," said another (personal communication, 31 July 
2008). Several respondents agreed that the worst thing about living in 
refugee camps was the inability to fill their time. "In the camps, we would 
only wait for food given to us by UNHCR and WFP which came in 
mediocre quantities without doing anything else," said one (personal 
communication, 15 August 2008). "We were with arms crossed, without 
jobs, waiting only for the small rations we got thanks to WFP," said 
another (personal communication, 15 August 2008). 
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One by one, each of the respondents who had been living in Rwanda's 
refugee camps made the decision to leave the camps and move to Kigali. 
Forty-seven percent of the respondents (7) who had passed time in 
refugee camps noted a desire to improve general living conditions as their 
main motivation for leaving. "I moved to earn a better living and improve 
our living conditions, which are different from that of camps," said one 
(personal communication, 9 September 2008). Another agreed, saying, "It 
was to find a better life, because of a life of suffering" (personal 
communication, 8 August 2008). 
13 percent of respondents (2) suggested education was their main 
motivation for leaving, as they wanted to attend school in Kigali. "I decided 
to leave the camp because I wanted to study. I wanted to go back to 
school like I used to," said one (personal communication, 31 July 2008). 
Another said, "I wanted to find a job in the city and find a way to study. I 
wanted to find a future" (personal communication, 15 August 2008). The 
remaining 40 percent (6) indicated their desire to find a job caused them to 
leave the camps, with one respondent saying, "I couldn't bring myself to 
accept living the difficult life there. I wanted to have permanent work to 
better survive" (personal communication, 22 August 2008). 
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While their reasons for leaving the camps varied, and do not in and of 
themselves necessarily affect their ability to integrate, they do point to the 
strong desire of all respondents to take control of their situations and try to 
eke out a better life for themselves. This high level of motivation is 
reflective of Banki's characterization of individual traits and their impact on 
refugee integration levels (see Ch. 6.7). Each of the respondents was 
highly determined to make a living in Kigali under any circumstances, a 
factor that Banki identifies as having a positive impact on levels of 
integration. 
Upon arrival in Kigali, the livelihood strategies of respondents differed 
almost immediately. Fifty percent of respondents (10) registered 
themselves with the UNHCR office in Kigali and were successful in gaining 
official recognition as an urban refugee. The other 50 percent of 
respondents (10) chose not to register themselves with UNHCR in Kigali 
and, according to official records, still remained camp refugees. Their 
reasons for doing so varied slightly, but almost all expressed the fear that 
they would be turned down, or worse, sent back to the camps, if they tried 
to apply for urban status. This points to both the lack of information 
refugees have with regards to the status determination process, as well as 
the strict qualifications necessary to be recognized as urban. 
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"Becoming an urban refugee demands lots of formalities which are difficult 
to fulfill. Even with those conditions it's very difficult to be accepted," said 
one (personal communication, 22 August 2008). "I am still registered in the 
camp in Kibuye. I don't think my application to stay in Kigali would be 
approved," said another (personal communication, 31 July 2008). "I came 
to Kigali for my own personal reasons. UNHCR knows me only as a non-
urban refugee. I think otherwise I will get sent back," said yet another 
(personal communication, 2 October 2008). Finally, one respondent said, 
"I didn't [register] because I left the camps without UNHCR's authorization. 
I had no choice." 
In the early days of arrival, the survival of many respondents was ensured 
by the combined efforts of various agencies, including UNHCR and 
several NGOs (see Table 16). Aside from those refugees granted urban 
status from the CNR, no respondents indicated receiving any assistance 
from the Rwandan government. In fact, 50 percent of illegal urban 
refugees were not even aware of the CNR's existence or what it meant to 
them. This would, again, seem to indicate a significant lack of education 
being given to asylum seekers upon arrival in Rwanda with regards to their 
rights and the refugee status determination process, as well as any 
potential available channels of support. 
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Of the 50 percent of respondents (10) officially registered in Kigali, 90 
percent (9) noted having received support from UNHCR. This support 
overwhelmingly took the form of financial support for medical services and 
education through to the end of secondary school. One hundred percent of 
these respondents (10) also cited assistance from the AHA in helping 
them pay for medical services. One 18 year old respondent, officially 
considered an urban refugee, noted that Right to Play had also assisted 
him in getting settled and adjusting to his new life through the use of 
sports, while another cited financial support from JRS for education. This 
indicates a seemingly significant reliance on both the UNHCR and the 
non-governmental sector by official urban refugees. 
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In contrast, of those respondents living in Kigali without official urban 
refugee status, only 10 percent (2) indicated receiving any support from an 
NGO, which took the form of financial assistance from JRS for education. 
That same 20 percent of respondents also cited assistance with medical 
care from the AHA. However, several of those respondents living in Kigali 
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without status noted that the support they used to receive from various 
NGOs in the refugee camps promptly stopped once they left. One 
respondent noted, "In the camps, I received help from Jesuit Refugee 
Services (JRS) for primary and secondary school, the World Food 
Program (WFP), the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) for heating 
blocks, and the AHA for health. Here in Kigali there are no NGOs which 
helped me. I'm forced to do my best alone in the city" (personal 
communication, 2 October 2008). None of the respondents living illegally 
in Kigali identified being given assistance from either the UNHCR or the 
Government. This points to a much heavier reliance on official channels of 
support by the urban refugees, while those living illegally in Kigali got by 













3 * ! ^ 
M 
a ^ w ^ ^ a * ^ ^ - „'.»•; ssr̂ ij 




























On being asked whether respondents felt it necessary to hide their status 
as refugees living in Kigali 45 percent (9) said yes. Of these, 33 percent 
(3) were official urban refugees. One official urban refugee said, ""I hide it 
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so I don't lose certain chances of working" (personal communication, 2 
October 2008), while yet another said, "I hide it because in Rwanda it's 
shameful to be a refugee. More than that, in Rwanda, refugees are 
blamed for everything" (personal communication, 15 August 2008). Illegal 
urban refugees expressed similar fears. "There is no importance in 
showing everybody that I'm a refugee because it doesn't serve any 
purpose. It would isolate me or make me different from the rest of the 
society that I am a part of here in Kigali," said one (personal 
communication, 22 August 2008). One student said, "I know that almost 
no one is proud of me. At school, if they know you're a refugee, they 
always make fun of you" (personal communication, 31 July 2008). 
However, the other 55 percent of respondents (11) felt no shame in being 
open about their refugee status in Kigali. "I don't hide it because I am one," 
said one respondent (personal communication, 22 August 2008). Several 
respondents agreed that, "Being a refugee is not a disease. It's not a 
voluntary choice" (personal communication, 9 September 2008), and "It's 
not us who want to be refugees. It could happen to anyone. The main 
cause is bad politics in our home country" (personal communication, 8 
August 2008). Still, several respondents felt being a refugee was nothing 
to hide because it was nothing to be ashamed of. "I don't hide it because I 
am proud of my nationality, my different language from Rwanda. I am 
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happy to tell people I am from Congo, and so a refugee," said one 
(personal communication, 9 September 2008). 
With the majority of respondents indicating their openness to disclosing 
their refugee status to others, this indicates that there has been little 
reprisal to date taken from the local police or the local population, or 
discrimination against them. In 2008, a total often refugees living in urban 
areas were arrested for not having the proper documents (USCRI, 2009). 
Still, despite younger respondents noting incidents of discrimination in 
school, the majority of respondents seemed to have no fear of physical 
threat or recrimination from the local people, indicating a significant level 
of comfort with their surroundings. Interestingly, whether a refugee had 
official urban status or not was shown to have little impact on their 
decision about whether or not to disclose that information. 
7.532 Employment 
Rwanda remains a predominantly rural population, lending itself to the fact 
that roughly 93 percent of females and 81 percent of males work in the 
agricultural sector, albeit the majority engaging in subsistence farming 
(Republic of Rwanda, 2005). This plays a major role in the determination 
of income levels, as the few public sector employees, private formal sector 
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employees and the self-employed are proportionally stronger represented 
in the higher income quintiles (MINECOFIN, 2002). In fact, the recent 
Diagnostic Trade Integration Study found that "occupation appears to be 
the single most important variable affecting the probability of being poor" 
(Republic of Rwanda, 2005a, p. 8). 
In Rwanda, the active population is considered to be roughly 4.5 million 
people; 15.5 percent of those are unemployed, and 48 percent are 
underemployed, working less than 35 hours per week (Republic of 
Rwanda, 2005). This, still, despite a consistent nationwide labor shortage. 
After having settled into their new lives in Kigali, 40 percent of respondents 
(7) indicated that they had found full-time jobs to support themselves, 71 
percent (5) of whom had official urban refugee status in Kigali (see Table 
18). These jobs ranged from a clothing store manager, a seamstress, an 
assistant in a financial institution, a hairdresser, a car mechanic at a local 
garage, and a high school teacher. Interestingly, 71 percent (5) had also 
completed secondary or tertiary education in their home countries before 
becoming refugees in Rwanda, while 14 percent (1) had completed 


















































57 percent (4) of those with full-time jobs had also held jobs in their home 
country before fleeing. For instance, one 35 year old male who studied 
management and accounting in university previously worked as an 
administrative clerk for an NGO in the DRC. After bypassing the refugee 
camps and directly being granted urban refugee status in 1998, he quickly 
found employment as the manager of a clothing store in Kigali, where he 
now earns RwF 100,000 per month. The current salaries in Rwanda for 
those respondents with full-time jobs ranged from RwF 20,000 to 150,000 
per month. 
The other 43 percent (3) currently employed in Kigali full-time did not 
previously hold jobs in the DRC. For instance, one 39 year old mother of 
seven whose family was dependent on her husband's income as a taxi 
driver in her home country before becoming a refugee was forced to find 
her own source of income after her husband's death. With a secondary 
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level education, she and her family would spend four months in a refugee 
camp before being granted the right to live in Kigali. There, she found work 
as a seamstress, a skill she learned as a girl from her mother. "Nobody 
lends me money - with a refugee card of identity, they can't," she says. 
"What I make is little and insufficient. I need at least an extra one hundred 
dollars each month. Still, my two oldest children also work sometimes. 
Together, we are able to feed the family" (personal communication, 29 
August 2008). 
Twenty-five percent of respondents (5) noted that while they did not have 
permanent employment, they do find enough small jobs in the informal 
sector to support themselves financially. One 29 year old male who 
dropped out of university because it was too expensive, but made a good 
living as a musician in his home country struggles to find work playing his 
music in Rwanda. "Occasionally, I find the opportunity to do my music. I 
play piano and bass guitar. I haven't had any permanent work, but I hope 
to have some very soon," he says. "That's where I find something for my 
survival. What I'm doing now is just enough to live in the city" (personal 
communication, 2 October 2008). 
Finally, the remaining 40 percent of respondents (8) reported having no 
employment whatsoever. Of these, 75 percent (6) noted they were in 
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school or otherwise engaged and could not work, and were thus 
dependent on family members or roommates for financial survival. One 23 
year old female student said, "I live thanks to my roommates who work" 
(personal communication, 15 August 2008), while another 22 year old 
male said, "I share life with my roommates. Often we find temporary work 
but it doesn't last a long time" (personal communication, 9 September 
2008). Thus, all of the respondents considered official urban refugees in 
Kigali are gainfully employed in either the formal or informal sectors, or are 
currently enrolled in school. Furthermore, 80 percent of illegal urban 
refugees were also employed in the city. 
Despite receiving no support from the Government, and only very limited 
support from UNHCR and NGOs, the majority of respondents were able to 
use their skills to find work. In all cases, respondents were not necessarily 
using the same skill set they had developed in their country of origin. Still, 
they were able to find or generate work for themselves, which could be 
considered a skill in and of itself, and one which would be well 
complemented by the provision of additional skills training programs. And 
all of this with little to no official support, and minimal reliance on other 
social networks. 
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Considering the percentage of respondents who chose to start a new life 
in Kigali for the purposes of finding a job and improving their living 
conditions, this study wanted to ascertain whether or not they continued to 
think that Kigali held greater economic opportunities for them than their 
previous lives in the camps. Twenty percent of respondents (4) indicated 
that they still felt that Kigali was a city of great opportunities for refugees. 
One 23 year old currently enrolled in university and studying Management 
noted, "Here we can find ways to make money to survive and clothe 
ourselves" (personal communication, 9 September 2008). Another 35 year 
old respondent who was working as a car mechanic agreed, saying, 
"There are many opportunities in Kigali since salaries are high" (personal 
communication, 2 October 2008). 
The other 80 percent of respondents (16) responded negatively, 
suggesting that there were few opportunities for refugees in Kigali. One 23 
year old woman who works as a hairdresser noted, "Our lives are hard 
because there is no assistance, especially with food" (personal 
communication, 29 August 2008). Despite having found work as a high 
school teacher, another 40 year old respondent noted, "Life is completely 
difficult in Rwanda, especially Kigali. There are no opportunities for 
refugees" (personal communication, 9 September 2008). 
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When asked whether they thought there were greater economic 
opportunities in Kigali for refugees now compared to when they first 
arrived, 30 percent (6) answered positively (see Table 19). Of these, 50 
percent (3) had spent more than ten years in Kigali, while the other 50 
percent had been there just over five years. Surprisingly, it was those 
respondents living illegally in Kigali who remained the most optimistic 
about their new lives. The 29 year old musician said, "Yes, more 
opportunities exist now since we have more contacts. The more time we 
stay in the city, the better connected we are" (personal communication, 2 
October 2008). Another 18 year old student noted, "Little by little things 
get a bit better. There are a few more opportunities for us now then when 
we first arrived in Kigali" (personal communication, 15 August 2008). 
The remaining 70 percent of respondents (14) felt that the extent of 
opportunities in Kigali for refugees had not changed since they first 
arrived. Still, it is important to note that when asked whether survival in 
Kigali was more difficult than in the camps and if they would consider 
returning, 95 percent of respondents (19) responded in the negative, 
suggesting that struggling to make a living in Kigali was still better than 




































Despite the majority of respondents identifying few opportunities for 
refugees in Kigali, all but one preferred their new lives over living in a 
camp. Even more interesting is the fact that it was those refugees living 
illegally in Kigali who remain the most optimistic about their situations. This 
would seem to indicate that in addition to having the personal traits of 
optimism and persistence, it was specifically this group of respondents 
that, despite difficult living conditions, felt especially comfortable within 
their communities, and felt confident in their abilities to survive in those 
communities. 
7.533 Political Freedoms and Access to Resources 
This research wanted to ascertain the perception of respondents towards 
their political and economic freedoms and the impact of those perceptions 
on their livelihood strategies and level of integration. While this study has 
already presented the legal rights of refugees in the eyes of the 
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Government of Rwanda, the perceptions of this group of refugees as to 
their rights were shown to be quite different. 
When asked whether they felt they had equal access to natural resources 
and markets as compared to Rwandans, 100 percent of respondents (20) 
answered in the affirmative, with the majority suggesting that the only 
barrier was that of financial means. "Everything is for sale like it is for 
everyone in Kigali. What is important is having the money," said one 
respondent (personal communication, 22 August 2008). Others agreed, 
saying, "We are allowed anywhere. We have free access but it depends 
on your means. I've had no problems. I benefit like anyone else" (personal 
communication, 31 July 2008), and "We should have access like everyone 
else but our means don't allow it" (personal communication, 15 August 
2008). 
Respondents were, however, more hesitant when asked whether they felt 
they had equal access to this land. Only 30 percent (6) agreed, with one 
saying, "Yes, there is no law that prevents us from living and working on 
the land" (personal communication, 29 August 2008). Of these, 67 percent 
had official urban refugee status. Still, the majority of respondents (14) 
suggested that "the land belongs to the people of Rwanda. It is not for us" 
(personal communication, 9 September 2008). Another said, "Land is for 
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the state and its citizens. With refugee status, that does not include us" 
(personal communication, 2 October 2008). 
In addition to access to resources, it was important to ascertain 
participants' perceptions towards their political freedoms, which 
necessarily impacts their ability to be self-sufficient and integrate into the 
local community. When asked whether they felt that the laws prevented 
them from engaging in economic activity, responses were split right down 
the middle, with 50 percent of respondents (10) answering yes, and 50 
percent (10) answering no. One legal urban refugee said, "Sometimes the 
fact that my identity card isn't Rwandan can prevent me from working, but 
it's the only thing" (personal communication, 12 September 2008). Another 
suggested, "A condition for economic activities is to be Rwandan and we 
aren't Rwandan" (personal communication, 15 August 2008). Meanwhile, 
those living in Kigali illegally also agreed, with one saying, "Because we 
don't have identity cards, the national law prevents some of us from 
working" (personal communication, 31 July 2008). 
Still, 50 percent of respondents felt that there was more flexibility and 
freedom to engaging economically. "The law doesn't stop us, but there are 
some activities or professions that require you to be of Rwandan 
nationality," said one. "I was a politician back home. I cannot do that here. 
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I cannot lead these people because they are not my people" (personal 
communication, 31 July 2008). Another suggested, "The law here is 
favorable for everyone. Nobody is stopping us from working or finding our 
own jobs. It's up to us" (personal communication, 15 August 2008). 
When asked whether they were scared of either the local people or local 
authorities, only 5 percent of respondents (1) said yes. Despite having 
official urban refugee status, the 18 year old male said, "I'm scared of the 
police because when I was young, the Congolese police treated me and 
my parents badly and told us that we were strangers. That's the reason 
why we are here in Rwanda now, because of the police" (personal 
communication, 15 August 2008). Still, the remaining 95 percent (19) of 
respondents said they were not afraid of the police in Rwanda, but instead 
felt protected by them. 
"I do not fear them. In fact, I am proud of them because they keep us in 
security," said one (personal communication, 29 August 2008). Others 
agreed, saying, "The people of Rwanda are nice and the police have 
never arrested me. On the contrary, they keep us safe" (personal 
communication, 12 September 2008), and, "In this country, human rights 
are respected and peace is king so everyone can be free and proud of 
who he is. On top of that, the people here are cool and the police are 
143 
sufficiently disciplined so I have nothing to be afraid o f (personal 
communication, 2 October 2008). Finally, one participant suggested that 
as long as he obeys the laws, he will not be reproached by police. "I follow 
all the laws. I have papers proving my status as a refugee. I am not guilty 
of anything. I am not a thief or a criminal. So I am not afraid" (personal 
communication, (31 July 2008). 
Participants were also asked whether they perceived local customs as 
standing in their way from engaging in economic activities. Here, 10 
percent of respondents (2), both of whom had official urban refugee 
status, agreed, with one suggesting that, "The law works together with the 
locals and their customs to keep us out" (personal communication, 15 
August 2008). However, 90 percent of respondents (18) disagreed, with 
one pointing out, "local customs are almost the same as ours so they do 
not bother us" (personal communication, 12 September 2008), while 
another suggested, "The customs of Rwanda don't have anything to do 
with my activities" (personal communication, 2 October 2008). Indeed, as 
Annette Nyekan, UNHCR Representative in Rwanda, noted, refugees 
from neighboring countries are easily assimilated in Rwanda because of 
similarities in culture and language, especially as many Rwandans were at 
one time refugees in their countries (Mutesi, 2008). 
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Interestingly, it were those respondents with legal urban status that 
expressed the most hesitation towards local laws and customs in Rwanda. 
Despite having the legal right to live and work in Kigali, they felt more 
restricted in their rights and movements than those respondents living 
illegally in the city. This would seem to demonstrate a deeper sense of 
integration held by those illegal urban refugees. As noted in Ch. 7.513, the 
majority of the illegal urban refugees live in the same household as local 
Rwandans. This closeness and the inevitable mixing of cultures seems to 
have narrowed the perception of differences in customs, and gave 
respondents a greater local network, as well as a coinciding greater 
confidence, in their rights and ability to do the things they want to do. Still, 
the findings also demonstrate the lack of knowledge on the part of 
respondents with regards to their own rights. 
7.534 Health and Nutrition 
Health services in Rwanda have traditionally come at a high cost, 
preventing the majority of Rwandans from accessing them. The 
Government hopes that with the introduction of its new community 
healthcare system, Mutuelles de Sante, and a new subsidy for certain 
treatment fees for the poorest households, basic healthcare will be made 
available to a greater percentage of the population. Indeed, from its pilot 
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phase in 2003 to late 2005, membership increased from 9 percent to 44 
percent on a national scale (Republic of Rwanda, 2006a). Still, there 
remain challenges of often having to pay 30 percent co-payment at the 
health center, requirement of individual registration of all family members, 
and the costs of health problems not covered under the scheme (Save the 
Children, 2005). For instance, 57 percent of Rwandans prefer to visit 
traditional healers in favor of government facilities, while 28 percent of 
women do not deliver at a government facility, both due to the high 
associated costs (OSSREA, 2006). 
This study wanted to ascertain the health and nutrition levels of 
respondents in order to measure their success in accessing food and 
medical services. Twenty-five percent of respondents (5) indicated that 
they suffer from minor health problems. However, the cost of healthcare 
was unanimously identified as the major obstacle to receiving treatment. "I 
have a throat problem that I can't treat since it requires seeing a doctor 
and that would cost me the eyes of the pope!" exclaimed one 29 year old 
male (personal communication, 2 October 2008). Another suggested, 
"When we suffer from a severe illness, especially one that's incurable in 
Africa or Rwanda, we can't easily find treatment. If we find it, we can't 
easily pay for it. So it's only God who cares for us" (personal 
communication, 8 August 2008). 
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Still, several respondents said that there is support to be found in paying 
for healthcare costs (see Table 20). Fifteen percent (3) of respondents 
officially registered as urban refugees said UNHCR covers their fees for 
basic treatment from a public hospital, while they must pay by themselves 
for services from a private hospital. Twenty percent of respondents (4) 
also considered officially urban said they continue to receive medical 
support from Africa Humanitarian Action. 
While urban refugees living legally in Kigali have the right to access health 
care services, thus in itself demonstrating one of Banki (2004) and 
Jacobsen's (2001) key indicators of refugee integration, the reality is that 
the majority of those respondents do make use of that right. Most of those 
considered legal could not afford the costs of health care on their own, and 
received little official support. Meanwhile, those illegal urban refugees did 
not even attempt to seek health care from traditional institutions, instead 
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seeking out assistance from friends, local healers, or even, in the case of 
one respondent, returning to the refugee camp in Kibuye where he is 
registered whenever he is sick to receive medical support from the 
organizations working there. The reality is then, that instead of being a 
burden on local services, the majority of respondents either suffered in 
silence or sought out their own means of taking care of themselves. 
Food security also continues to pose a concern. The five crops that 
contribute to more than 70 percent of the consumption basket in Rwanda's 
rural areas have been in constant decline. Coupled with an expanding 
population, this results in permanent deficits of calories, proteins and lipids 
(Republic of Rwanda, 2006b). Only 3.3 percent of households have three 
or more meals per day, with the great majority of 78.7 percent taking two 
meals and 18 percent having only one. And with regards to the quality of 
the food, 81 percent of households claim to rarely eat proteins in the form 
of meat or fish. Indeed, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
estimates that 3 million Rwandans were undernourished in 2003, 
representing 36 percent of the population (FAO, 2004). 
Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in the northwest have a comparably high 
agricultural potential, but they were longer affected by considerable 
insecurity and still lack sufficient housing. Many returning refugees were 
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resettled in Kibungo and Umutara in the east which now suffers from a 
lack of infrastructure and environmental pressure. Kigali, Butare and 
Gikongoro in the south have a low agricultural potential with relative 
aridity, soil acidity and high population density (Government of Rwanda, 
2002). 
100 percent of respondents (20) stated that they do not grow their own 
food for either subsistence or for sale. This is in line with food production 
trends throughout the city. With the highest population density and fastest 
urbanization rate in all of Africa, Kigali sees very few of its residents 
engaging in subsistence farming. "In Kigali, nobody farms," said one 35 
year old male. "Even people originally from here don't cultivate" (personal 
communication, 12 September 2008). Another 31 year old female said, "In 
Kigali, we don't farm, except for those lucky enough to get a large piece of 
land. We don't have any land. That is for the rich" (personal 
communication, 2 October 2008). Furthermore, 95 percent of respondents 
(19) said they did not own any domestic animals, while 5 percent (1) 
owned several goats. 
To meet their food requirements, 95 percent of respondents (19) thus said 
they buy all of their food from local markets. The remaining respondent, a 
23 year old female with official urban status, said she continued to receive 
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food through the support of the WFP. Still, 90 percent of respondents (18) 
said that what they were eating was not enough to survive. "With the $40 I 
make per month and $120 from my husband, it's just not enough to feed 
the nine people in my house. It's never enough," said one woman 
(personal communication, 29 August 2008). Others said, "Food is very 
expensive here. Life is very expensive here. What I am able to buy is 
always less than what I need" (personal communication, 2 October 2008), 
and, "We are four people - one works but the others are students. It's the 
one who works who pays for us and with the little he makes, so we never 
have enough to eat" (personal communication, 31 July 2008). Meanwhile, 
one respondent suggested that refugees are always going to be worse off 
than their local counterparts: "Rwandans don't have enough to eat with 
their opportunities, so for refugees it's even worse" (personal 
communication, 9 September 2008). 
Food security for urban refugees represents a similar dilemma to that of 
health care. While those recognized as legal can farm their land de jure, 
the economic reality, complicated by land scarcity in Rwanda, prohibits 
them from doing so de facto. Illegal urban refugees face the same 
realities, and are thus forced to buy what they can with the little money 
they make. Still, those illegal urban refugees placed more confidence in 
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their own abilities and social networks to survive over their legal 
counterparts. 
7.535 Social Networks 
The current proliferation of research on social capital began following the 
influential work of Robert Putnam et al. (1993), where he documented a 
striking connection between membership in organizations and the quality 
of government. According to Putnam et al., social capital "refers to the 
collective value of all 'social networks' [who people know] and the 
inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other 
['norms of reciprocity']" (2004, p. 1). Social capital is the benefits that arise 
from the sense of trust, reciprocity, information and cooperation 
associated with social networks. 
The value of social networks has been a part of Rwandan society before 
Putnam et al. ever put it on paper. They are the lifeblood of the society, 
not least as it is currently working to rebuild a shared tragic history. For 
instance, on the last Saturday of every month, the people of Rwanda 
engage in an event called Umuganda. Everyone goes onto the streets and 
works on common public projects - everything from sweeping sidewalks to 
filling potholes to planting trees. This tradition, despite being considered 
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an annoyance by some of the young, is considered a valuable community 
activity by the majority of the population. It reflects the strong communal 
nature of social care, and the way in which institutional arrangements of 
social organization can become effective private social safety nets. 
This study found that most respondents had begun to form and take 
advantage of social networks in Rwanda. Sixty percent of respondents 
indicated that they have become part of at least one local group or team 
since moving to Kigali. These include: football teams, basketball teams, 
rugby teams, a modern dance group, and a church worship group. All 
respondents noted that their groups were comprised of both Rwandans 
and fellow refugees, indicating a significant level of interaction between 
the two groups. On a broader level, 70 percent of respondents (14) felt 
that they belonged to a close-knit community in Kigali: 30 percent (6) to 
the local Congolese community, and 40 percent (8) to a community of 
mixed Congolese and Rwandans. "We try to integrate," says one 26 year 
old student. "The Congolese community is close, but I'm cool with 
Rwandans too. Everywhere I go, whether I'm with other refugees or 
nationals, I'm comfortable" (personal communication, 31 July 2008). 
Meanwhile, 30 percent of respondents (6) felt no community ties 
whatsoever. 
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The majority of respondents, both legal and illegal, expressed having 
formed some kind of social network during their time in Rwanda, one of 
the key indicators of refugee integration according to both Banki (2004) 
and Jacobsen (2001). The sports teams, church groups, and the like 
demonstrate that respondents are significantly dispersed among the local 
population, both of whom put aside any differences in title, status, or 
culture to enjoy activities together. 
7.536 Future Prospects 
All of the participants in this study had come to Kigali in order to try and 
make a new life for themselves. They saw the city as holding out greater 
opportunities and promise for their futures. Now, several years after they 
made that decision, do they still feel the same way about Kigali? Is it still a 
city of freedom and hope? Have they found the opportunities they were 
looking for? This study wanted to ascertain what participants considered 
their future prospects and whether their move to Kigali brought them 
everything they had first hoped for. This is especially important as one of 
Banki's (2003) key indicators of refugee integration is that refugees are not 
necessarily able to support themselves, but they are at the very least 
moving towards self-sufficiency. 
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When asked if they were happy with their new lives in Kigali, 20 percent 
(4) said yes, all of whom were those living without official urban status. 
Despite all the difficulties of trying to find work and enough food to survive, 
this 20 percent agreed that these difficulties were a small price to pay for 
having their freedom outside of a refugee camp. "For the most part, I am 
happy because it's myself alone who is trying to survive here in the city 
and it was tiring living under the sheeting of the camp," said one 24 year 
old male (personal communication, 31 July 2008). Another said, "On the 
one hand, yes I am happy, because I have peace. On the other hand, no, 
because my hope for a good future is small" (personal communication, 2 
October 2008). 
Meanwhile, 80 percent of respondents (16) identified themselves as still 
being unhappy with their new lives in Kigali. Several identified cost of living 
as the major hindrance, with one saying, "Life here is difficult since 
everything has to be bought and at high prices" (personal communication, 
12 September 2008). Another suggested, "Life in Kigali is too expensive. It 
isn't favorable for refugees" (personal communication, 15 August 2008). 
Others said that they will never be happy living in Kigali because it is not 
their home city. "I will not be happy until I am in my own country," said one 
(personal communication, 24 October 2008). Another said, "We are not 
happy with our lives because we are in another country" (personal 
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communication, 15 August 2008). Still, despite these sentiments, there 
was still an overwhelming gratitude for the fact that they were able to 
choose their own paths by moving to Kigali. As one respondent noted, "I 
am not too happy here, but when we don't have what we like, we are 
grateful for what we have" (personal communication, 9 September 2008). 
Given these sentiments, what did participants think lay ahead for them in 
the future? 90 percent of respondents (18) indicated their desire to return 
to their home country as soon as it was safe to do so. "As soon as peace 
returns to my country, I have to return. They say home is always sweeter," 
said one (personal communication, 22 August 2008). Another said, "We 
hope for peace, security, unity because then we can return. That is my first 
wish" (personal communication, 15 August 2008). Yet another said, 
"That's our only thought. We think about it every day. If one day there is 
political stability, if the war finishes, if our country has peace. But we must 
always be careful of being killed. Unfortunately, the president of our 
country doesn't accept us as citizens" (personal communication, 15 
August 2008). 
Meanwhile, one respondent with official urban status indicated a desire to 
leave Africa entirely, saying, "We need help to relocate to a continent that 
is not ours, for another country that is not our own" (personal 
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communication, 8 August 2008). The final respondent, living unofficially in 
Kigali, could not yet bring himself to think about returning home, saying, "I 
don't think about the future. I just think about now. I don't even have the 
courage to think about returning home because of the war that I left and all 
the ignoble acts that happened and that are still happening today in my 
home village" (personal communication, 2 October 2008). 
Until peace returns in the DRC, all but one of the respondents were 
determined to continue trying to make a life for themselves in Kigali, rather 
than return to the camps. "Life for a refugee is never better. But in a camp 
refugees receive little quantities of food and no one has anything to do like 
activities to earn a living," said one respondent (personal communication, 
22 August 2008). Others said, "In the camps, it's something else. You 
need to visit there to understand. Here we are free" (personal 
communication, 31 July 2008), "Life in the city is expensive and difficult 
but sometimes certainly opportunities open up, things that are different 
than in camps where refugees are confined" (personal communication, 9 
September 2008), and "Whether we are in the city or in the camp, life is 
hard because we are refugees. We are not ourselves. But life is better in 
the city because everything depends on what we are, what we do, and 
what we can do!" (personal communication, 15 August 2008). 
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Twenty-five percent of respondents (5) indicated their desire to finish 
university, and their hope that doing so would bring about a brighter future. 
"The future will be better maybe once I have finished school. Maybe then I 
will find a job," said one respondent (personal communication, 12 
September 2008). Another said, "I hope for the improvement of my life, a 
life where I am not still a refugee. After school, I think of opening my own 
garage" (personal communication, 2 October 2008). Yet another said, "To 
make the future better, I hope to study in university to earn a living. I want 
to be a politician who will do what he can to resolve the problems 
confronting our region" (personal communication, 31 July 2008). 
Unsurprisingly, when asked whether they needed additional support from 
aid organizations or the government in order to survive in Kigali, all of the 
respondents overwhelmingly said yes. Education, health, housing, and 
food were at the top of the list for financial support. Others requested "help 
in finding a good job," "help to reintegrate," and "help to find how to bring 
peace to my home country." 
Despite the overwhelming majority of respondents being unhappy with 
their current situations in Kigali, it is telling that all but one preferred it to 
living in the camps. This would seem to indicate a hope, albeit largely 
unexpressed, about the possibilities for self-sufficiency. 
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8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 
This chapter presents a summary of the main findings of this study, as well 
as a set of conclusions and opportunities, which would enhance the 
viability of integration as one possible alternative solution to protracted 
refugee crises. 
The study had two main objectives: firstly, it developed the concept for 
analyzing the viability of integration as one alternative solution to 
protracted refugee crises. Secondly, it applied that concept to a select 
group of urban refugees in Rwanda, analyzing their levels of self-
sufficiency and integration. 
8.1 Summary 
All of the respondents were considered to be in the productive age range, 
with the majority below the age of 35. The proportion of illegal urban 
refugees below the age of 35 was significantly higher, demonstrating the 
negative effect of age on their willingness to take the risk of living in an 
urban area without official permission. 
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80 percent of respondents had some level of education prior to arriving in 
Rwanda as refugees. Illegal urban refugees were twice as likely to have 
vocational training versus formal training, while legal urban refugees were 
twice as likely to have university-level education. At the time of this study, 
45 percent of respondents were enrolled in formal education in Kigali, 
demonstrating the ability of both legal and illegal urban refugees to access 
educational opportunities. Still, while all legal refugees received official 
channels of support for their education, only 20 percent of the illegal 
refugees received any kind of financial support, instead finding the means 
on their own or through their roommates and social networks. 
All of the legal refugees lived in households with other refugees. 
Meanwhile, 60 percent of the illegal refugees lived in households with 
native Rwandans. Those refugees who lived with their families were also 
all legally recognized as urban. Taken together, these two findings indicate 
that it was individuals rather than families who were more willing to take 
the risk of leaving the camps without official permission. Once in Kigali, 
these refugees also had fewer refugee networks to rely on and, as a 
result, mixed more with local Rwandans. 
Prior to becoming refugees in Rwanda, 40 percent of respondents were 
gainfully employed in their home country, while 45 percent were otherwise 
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occupied and not seeking employment. Thus, only 15 percent of 
respondents were unemployed prior to arriving in Rwanda, with 85 percent 
arriving with prior skills and experience, and seeking ways to put those 
skills to use. 
At the time of this study, 40 percent of respondents, including both legal 
and illegal refugees, had found full-time work in Kigali. Fifty-seven percent 
of these had been employed full-time in the DRC. With one of the highest 
pupil-to-teacher ratios in the region at 69 to 1, several respondents, such 
as the high school teacher, held jobs that could be considered highly 
valuable in Rwanda. Meanwhile, 25 percent of respondents had found 
temporary work that was enough to support themselves financially, and 30 
percent were otherwise engaged. Only 10 percent of respondents 
remained unemployed. 
75 percent of respondents had been in Rwanda for over ten years. Of 
those who arrived most recently between 2002 and 2005, three had found 
employment and two were enrolled in school. This demonstrates that the 
amount of time spent in Rwanda was not as large a factor in determining 
their levels of self-sufficiency and integration as others. In addition, those 
25 percent of respondents who did not spend any time in a refugee camp 
before arriving to Kigali were all over the age of 30, indicating that their 
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higher levels of experience and skills were likely the deciding factor in 
allowing them to live in urban areas. 
90 percent of the legal refugees received support from either UNHCR or 
various NGOs or both. This support largely took the form of financing for 
education or health care. Meanwhile, only ten percent of those illegal 
urban refugees received any kind of support, and it came from NGOs. This 
would seem to counter arguments suggesting urban refugees are 
necessarily a drain on social services. Instead, they found work or relied 
on roommates and other social networks for financial means. 
55 percent of respondents indicated their willingness to be open about 
their refugee status, including both legal and illegal urban refugees. This 
could be owing to the fact that 50 percent felt that Rwandan laws 
prevented them from engaging economically, and 70 percent of 
respondents believed their refugee status prohibited their equal access to 
resources such as land. Still, only five percent of respondents indicated a 
fear of Rwanda police. Instead, 90 percent of respondents felt that local 
customs were accommodating, if not similar to their own. 
The study found that while all of the legal urban refugees made use of 
official channels of support to access health care, those channels were 
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closed off to illegal urban refugees, who refrained from getting medical 
care, paid for it from their own funds, or returned to the camps. 
Compounding this problem is the inability of all the respondents to grow 
their own food for subsistence, and 95 percent unable to purchase any 
domestic animals. Only one respondent continued to receive food from 
official channels of support. 
60 percent of respondents indicated they were a part of at least one local 
group or team in Kigali, while 40 percent noted they felt that they belonged 
to tight-knit community that included Rwandans - almost all of which were 
illegal urban refugees. 
Finally, only 20 percent of respondents felt that Kigali still had many 
opportunities for refugees, while 30 percent said it offered at least more 
opportunities than when they had first arrived. Still, all but one said they 
would ever consider returning to the camps instead of struggling to make a 
living in Kigali. Instead, there was an overwhelming preference of 90 
percent of respondents who wanted to return to their home country as 
soon as it was safe to do so. 
8.2 Conclusion 
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This study sought to examine the role of local integration and the 
relevance of self-reliance as part of comprehensive durable solutions to 
protracted refugee crises. Indeed, in its first chapters, this study concluded 
that within a comprehensive solutions strategy, local integration and self-
reliance can and should have their respective proper places. Indeed, 
implementing strategies of self-reliance can, by developing and 
strengthening refugees' skills and livelihoods, bring benefits to all 
stakeholders involved. 
For host states, self-reliance allows refugees to contribute to the 
sustainable social and economic development of the country, as well as 
attract additional resources which can also benefit host communities. For 
the international and donor community, self-reliance can reduce the need 
for open-ended relief assistance and further underpins the durability of 
solutions. For refugees, it can give them the dignity and support they need 
to help them regain control of their lives. 
As outlined in Chapter 6.7, local integration is a two-way process with 
three interrelated dimensions: (i) Legal; (ii) Economic; and (iii) 
Social/Cultural. In revisiting the indicators of refugee integration, this study 
shows that amongst this select group of Rwanda's urban refugees, both 
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those considered legal and not have achieved a significant level of 
integration into their local communities. 
In the legal dimension of integration, the Rwandan Government has 
granted urban refugees a wide range of rights that are broadly 
commensurate with those enjoyed by its own citizens - of which illegal 
urban refugees are also to take advantage of de jure. Respondents are 
not restricted in their movements, and indeed, are rarely hassled by the 
local people or police. Despite the hindrance of financial means, they have 
access to local institutions and services, as well as natural resources. Still, 
it should be noted that respondents' legal rights and their perceptions of 
their rights were often two different things, as well as their rights de facto 
and the associated vulnerabilities. 
In the economic dimension of integration, the Rwandan Government has 
granted urban refugees the right to work and indeed, the large majority of 
respondents - legal and not - have taken advantage of this. Most came to 
Rwanda armed with prior skills and work experience, and are now working 
to support themselves and contribute to the society in which they live. It is, 
in fact, those illegal urban refugees who were not able to access official 
channels of support that have proven the most resilient in becoming self-
sufficient and maximizing their opportunities. As such, instead of being a 
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drain on aid resources, these refugees have proven they can survive on 
their own, and with the support of their own social networks. Still, their 
struggle to pay for the high cost of living in Kigali, including certain social 
services, represents an additional stepping stone to full economic 
integration. 
In its third social and cultural dimension, both respondents and the local 
population have proven especially adaptable and were found to be, in 
many cases, deeply dispersed among the local population. The majority of 
respondents either belonged to a group or team with local Rwandans, or 
indicated that they felt part of the local community. This was largely 
assisted by the similarities in culture and language between the DRC and 
Rwanda. Interestingly, it was the illegal urban refugees - those who 
arrived in Kigali with no family networks - who seemed to integrate the 
most whether by choice or not. Indeed, arriving in Kigali as individuals 
made them more eager to seek out new networks of support, including 
among local Rwandans. 
Overall, the significant integration of these urban refugees can be 
predominantly attributed to legal and social factors. Armed with the right to 
live and work in the city (or the semblance of such rights in the case of 
illegal urban refugees), they have the opportunity to maximize their skills 
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as they choose, and with little hassle from the local people or police. And, 
with significant similarities in ethnicity, language and cultural customs to 
the host country, this group had little trouble adapting to their new 
environments. While the timing of their arrival in Kigali proved to have little 
significance on integration levels, the individual traits of risk-taking and 
perseverance seemed a common factor that also aided in their integration, 
especially among the illegal urban refugees. 
Respondents continued to face a number of problems affecting their 
livelihoods strategies, including lack of employment opportunities, low 
wages, and, in certain cases, their status as refugees. Still, this study has 
demonstrated that despite these challenges, and despite receiving little to 
no official support, they have managed to become active agents in looking 
after their own needs. They have not necessarily been crippled by their 
status as refugees, nor have they become a drain on the society around 
them. Indeed, they have sacrificed much of the support they used to 
receive in camps for the chance to make it on their own. 
In conclusion, then, this study has shown that the gradual achievement of 
self-sufficiency gives an indication of the extent to which legal, economic, 
and social integration has been achieved among this group of urban 
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refugees in Rwanda, and lends itself to the opening up of new 
opportunities in the quest for a sustainable solution. 
8.3 Opportunities 
With the highest population density on the continent, and an already 
severe housing shortage, Rwanda is not a country that can afford to 
implement a catch-all strategy of refugee self-reliance and integration. 
Indeed, camps would seem to have an unfortunate but inevitable place in 
the Government's response to the refugee crisis. Still, as this study has 
shown, integration of refugees can also have its place alongside the 
traditional response. Indeed, the urban refugees interviewed for this study 
were all found to be young, skilled, and ready and willing to contribute, and 
had already achieved a significant level of integration despite shortages of 
official support. 
In view of these findings, it would seem that certain opportunities exist for 
the stakeholders involved to maximize the potential of integration as one 
prong of a multi-pronged response to situations of protracted refugee 
crises. These opportunities include: 
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• Upon arrival in transit centers, refugees' profiles should be examined to 
determine whether local integration might be a viable solution. If this 
process began early enough, it would help minimize any risk of 
protracted situations. Factors to take into account include, among 
others, age, skills, and dependents. 
• While the Government of Rwanda has provided the legal basis for 
refugees to exercise their rights, a burden falls on the international 
community to then ensure the capacities of the country to help 
refugees achieve self-sufficiency are there. Increased funding could 
be made available for projects that benefit both urban refugee and 
local Rwandans, including income generation and microfinance 
activities, job-oriented skills training, and education grants or 
scholarships. This would also go to dispel any myths that refugees are 
a drain on the society but are capable of both supporting themselves 
and contributing to society. 
• Increased training should be made available to urban refugees, 
especially informing them of their rights and responsibilities, in order 
that they take advantage of all the opportunities open to them. 
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ANNEX I 




1) What is your country/region of origin? 
2) What is your ethnic group? 
3) What is the composition of your household: number of individuals, 
sex, age, professions, dependents, residency status? 
4) When did you arrive in Rwanda? 
5) Did you spend any time in camps before self-settling? 
6) Do you still have family members who live in camps? 
7) If appropriate, what were the positive aspects of camp life? 
8) If appropriate, what were the negative aspects of camp life? 
9) What was the hardest situation you faced? 
10) What strategy did you use to cope? (i.e.: sale of goods, reducing 
consumption, sell firewood, leave family) 
11) What are your most frequent purchases? 
12) What are your major sources of income? 
13) What are your major sources of spending? 
14) Do you have any source of borrowing money? If so, what? 
15) Is there a spirit of cooperation in the community? If so, has it 
changed over time? 
16) What social networks do you belong to? 
Politics 
1) Does the law prevent you from engaging in economic activities? Do 
you respect this law? 
2) Do local customs prevent you from engaging in economic activities? 
Do you respect these customs? 
3) Is the central government policy conducive to your activities? 
4) Do you have free access to markets? 
5) Do you have free access to natural resources? 
6) If appropriate, how do you do deal with these restrictions? 
General Means of Existence 
17) How long have you been here? 
18) Where were you before coming here? 
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19) What were you doing before fleeing your home country? 
20) What are the characteristics of your life/work now? What activities 
do you engage in? 
21) How would you rate your physical safety? 
22) Do you fear/face threats from the local population? From the 
police? 
23) Do you own/rent a house/apartment? Who pays for it? 
24) What role has the government played in your life? 
25) What role has the UNHCR played in your life - in the beginning 
and now? 
26) What role have other organizations played? 
27) Do you have special skills? Are you able to use them? 
28) What opportunities and constraints in business have you 
encountered? 
29) Have you been assisted in these circumstances (i.e.: loans, 
training etc.) 
30) What is your main source of income? Has that changed over time? 
Food and Nutrition 
31) Do you have access to land? 
32) Do you grow your own crops? 
33) Is this sufficient to meet your needs and those of your family? 
34) Who is responsible for looking after the harvest? 
35) What is the history of support from the WFP? Other organizations? 
36) Have you had to sell food to survive? If so, to who? 
37) Do you have cattle/goat? 
38) Are there options for increasing the availability of food? If so, what? 
Health 
39) What major health problems have you or your family experienced 
today and in the past? 
40) How do you cope? 
41) Do you have access to a clinic? 
42) How many times a day do you eat? 
43) How many fruits/vegetables do you usually eat? 
44) Where do you get your drinking water? How is it collected/stored? 
45) Who in the household is responsible for collecting water? 




47) What is the educational status of household members? 
48) What skills, capacity, knowledge do they each have? 
49) Do your children go to school? Is it far from home? Do they go 
every day? 
50) Who pays for their schooling? 
51) How many students are there per teacher? 
52) Do your children have their own school supplies? 
Market 
53) Where is the nearest market? How far is it? 
54) How many times do you go? 
55) Do you go to buy or sell? 
56) What do you buy or sell? 
Possibilities 
57) When you arrived, what were the options you had to support 
yourself and your family? 
58) What are the opportunities that exist today? 
59) Do you have professional qualifications? If so, what? 
60) Are your qualifications recognized? 
61) Do you put your qualifications to use? 
62) What training did you receive in order to promote/support your 
skills? What was the outcome? 
Conclusion 
60) Are there any additional comments relevant to this research topic 
that you would like to make? 
Date of interview: 
Duration of interview: 
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